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SUMMARY 
Alienation has been a persistent problem for man since the 
beginning of civilization. But it has assumed importance in philosophy 
and literature in the society with the development of industry and 
technology on a mass scale. Earlier philosophers, particularly Greeks, 
were more concerned with the cosmos and ideas. Man was also treated as 
the manifestation of Rationality (Aristotle). Except Socrates no other 
western thinker seems to be interested in the individual man of flesh and 
bones, his sufferings, his choice of destiny, his growth and his death. Of 
course Greek plays and poetry did not ignore man as an aspiring and 
suffering individual like promethius, philosophy on the whole remained 
interested in generalizations and universal ideas and principles. Mystics 
though their approach apparently God-centric, dealt with individual man, 
for it was he whose spiritual journey was their main concern. In the east 
BuddhismJ5 the only philosophy that is concerned with human suffering. 
Buddha was mainly interested in finding out a way out from suffering. 
Likewise in Sufi tradition we find interest in individual man and his 
spiritual uplift. These philosophers prescribed ways towards de-
alienation. 
Hegel was the first western philosopher who discussed the problem 
of "estrangement" of God from His creation, and in this context he also 
dealt with the problems of man's Alienation. As against Hegel's 
idealistic-Rationalistic approach to this problem, Kierkegaard, his 
contemporary, approached this issue from human view-point and thus laid 
down foundation of existentialist philosophy of man, which found 
exponents in the twentieth century as Jespers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel 
and Camus. Earlier than modern existentialists, Karl Marx, paid attention 
as to how man is alienated from nature, God, society and himself in 
capitalist, industrial society. The 20th century "philosophy of inan" in a 
highly mechanical culture dominated by technocracy and bureaucracy 
found man reduced to the status of a negligible pat of a gignatic 
machinery that resulted in a continuing process of dehumanization, a 
form and cause of individual's alienation at various levels. 
The real problem for existentialist philosophy is not alienation and 
absurdity of life but it is the problem of overcoming alienation and 
making life meaningful. I, therefore, have taken up the question of 
dealienation also at the end of my research thesis as a meaningful 
conclusion to the discussion on the theme of alienation. 
Alienation and dealienation have been amply studied in both 
philosophy and literature in recent times, because of their great relevance 
for our times. But so far no comprehensive study of the issue has been 
taken up by any Indian scholar or researcher. This problem cannot be 
comprehensively studied without taking into account various conceptions 
of man. I have taken up this issue also with special reference to main 
existentialist thinkers. 
The predicament of contemporary man is best predicted not only in 
the absurd literatures of the Anglo-American and European languages but 
also in the languages of developing world. With the eradication of 
traditional values and facing the world without a God and where there 
can be no appeal to supernatural forces and where the traditional 
religious beliefs have lost their relevance and efficacy, man finds himself 
hanging between earth and heaven. His feet cannot reach the earth and 
his hands are unable to get hold of skies. In the absence of religious 
beliefs and prospects of another world after this life, man has to squarely 
face the fact of his death and annihilation. 
Since for the most of the contemporary men, there is no God man 
is the author of his destiny and he is the only source of his values. He is 
free to choose and as Dostovesky has said, "if there is no god everything 
is allowed". This implies that man is solely responsible for his condition 
in this life. Man creates his own society. Man creates his own world. 
Consequently it is only man who is responsible for his actions. In this 
situation when man is deprived of the traditional supports of religion and 
other sorts of supernatural systems, and when he is confronted with a 
hostile environment in a society where there is no social justice and 
above all when man has this realization that some day he has to die and 
that will be the end of his world. He not only feels despair and anguish 
but often times feels not only alienated from the society and the people 
around him but also from himself. 
Today people have acquired a certain amount of general knowledge 
regarding the main types of existence, such as that of wage-earner, the 
salaried employee, the peasant, the handicrafts-man, the entrepreneur, the 
civil servant. But the general fellowship of our human situation has been 
rendered even more dubious than before, in as much as, though the old 
ties of cast have been loosened, a new restriction of the individual to 
some prescribed status in the sociological machinery has become 
manifest. What is today common to us all, is not our humanity as a 
universal and all pervading spirit of fellowship, but the cosmopolitanism 
of catchwords in conjuction with the spread of world-wide means of 
communication. The general sociological situation is not the decisive 
factor in our destines, being rather that which threatens us with 
annihilation. The decisive factor is the developing possibility of a 
selfhood. This selfliood does not yet exist for contemporary man. 
We are not much aware of the pre-historical man although 
contemporary and anthropological research has been able to bring out 
massive researches on the life conditions of ancient man who was mostly 
confined to his tribe culture and moores. He mostly substained by 
mythical views and Ritual engagements. However, subsequently powerful 
religious traditions emerged and man at different points of history and 
geography lived by articulate world views and value systems. The 
historical religions such as Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam etc. 
provided elaborate doctrinal frame works wherein ontological. 
cosmological and axiological questions pertaining to human existence 
were sought to be answered. For the last three thousand years, man has 
been living within the parameters of these frame works. His existential 
questions, his socio-political ideas and his moral do's and dont's were 
responded by these world views. However with onset of modernization 
chiefly heralded by experimental science and technology, the grip of 
historical religions on human societies has been loosened. Science, 
although presumably a value free enterprise and methodical integration of 
the universe, as a matter of fact impinges upon our values beliefs and 
cultural outlooks and consequently a new civilization pattern emerges 
with its own normative structure and interests and priorities. 
Therefore, contemporary man is caught between his tradition, 
religion, moorings and modern scientific imperatives. The tradition. 
r 
religion, and modem science simultaneously pulls modern mind and 
compel for his loyalties. Religion traditionally provided him a set of 
definitions and norms whereby man could a-tune himself to the vast 
space-time continuum called universe. Science . leads, him to 
technological development but it simultaneously robes him of his 
spiritual moorings. Thus modern man is on the horns of any self analysis. 
This has lead to wide spread normlessness and consequently modern man 
is alienated from himself, from universe and from God. 
The construction of mental situation of the present will continue 
with growing awareness of the limits of the knowledge, on the one hand 
and of the risks of undue absoluteness, on the other, there will be a 
tendency to rest content with particular perspectives as representations of 
the situation. In their particularity they will be valid but they will have no 
absolute validity. 
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CHAPTER I 
CONCEPT OF MAN IN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT 
"What is the nature of man"? is surely one of the 
most important questions of philosophy. For, whatever 
questions we raise regarding human situation depend 
ultimately on our view of human nature, the meaning and 
purpose of human life, what man ought to do and hopes to 
achieve e t c . , are fundamentally affected by whatever one 
thinks is the real or true nature of man. In the history of 
western thought, philosophers, scientists and men of letters 
have sought to know man, ei ther with the dualistic 
hypothesis or with a monoistic hypothesis. The upholders 
of the dualistic hypothesis have suggested that man is the 
unity of two principal components i . e . body and spir i t , which 
though they are logically independent are yet substantially 
united together as man. On the other hand, the upholders 
of the moni^istic hypothesis considered the real nature of 
man ei ther as purely spiri tual or as purely material. 
In ancient Greece Pythagoras was probably the first 
philosopher to uphold a dualistic hypothesis for explaining 
the existence of man. For him and his followers man is a 
composite of body and soul. Soul being the eternal 
element while body is a temporal phenomenon. Pythagoras 
believed in transmigration of souls and he was of the view 
that man is an integral part of cosmos. The soul changes 
i t s bodily forms; sometimes it may appear in human form, 
sometime in animal form and sometime in plant form. He 
believed that purity was to be sought by silence, self-
examination, abstention from flesh, and the observ&ice of 
other ri tuals which the pythagoras interpreted symbolically. 
For Plato and Aristotle also man is a composite 
2 being consituted by the elements of body and soul . In 
agreement with Pythagoras Plato was of the view that the 
soul is eternal and i ts original home is beyond space and 
time. Its presence in this world indicates a fall in state. 
For Plato reality consists of Ideas and these ideas are 
beyond space and time and they are eternal and unchanging. 
Soul actually belongs to that realm. The human soul in its 
fallen state on this earth aspires to reach out again to i ts 
original home, the realm of ideas . But at the same time 
it is bound by the body and i t s earthly needs often make it 
forget i t s real aspirations. So according to Plato there is 
a built-in tension in the human situation. On the one hand 
human spir i t aspires to fly but on the other hand its 
bodily weight pulls it down to ear th. 
What is the true nature of man? Replies Aristotle, 
"We see it clearest in the most intellectual and most 
3 
highly socialized life of man" . Differently expressed, man 
is by nature intellectual and social; and therefore the 
ideal life is the life of the philosopher, the life of the 
citizen in a free city-state and the life of friendshio. 
For Aristotle every entity of this universe is composed of 
matter and form; being the actuality and matter being 
the possibi l i ty . So far as man is concerned we can say that 
soul is the form of man and according to Aristotle every 
object in this universe aims to achieve its true form. So we 
can say that according to Aristotle the evolution of a man 
consists in actualizing his true form i . e . his soul. 
Aristotle also was of the view that a man cannot realize 
his true form in a state of loneliness. A man needs the 
company of other men in order to realize his true self. 
That is why Aristotle called man a social animal. But by 
virtue of being a social animal man is also a political 
animal according to Aristotle. Here again we can discern 
that there i s a tension built-in the very structure of man. 
On the one hand man is supposed to realize, actualize his 
own particular true form but on the other hand he is 
required to seek the help and assistKice of others for 
doing the same . 
For Epicures human organism is composed of atoms 
undergoing characteristic patterns of change. Like all other 
-atomic compounds man came into being when the necessary 
conditions have been met. He has no creator and no 
destiny. His good is pleasure, his highest good is a 
life of secure and lasting pleasure. According to him men 
are not united by any natural bond, they form alliances for 
5 
mutual advantage . 
Coming to modem times; for Descartes man is a 
composite of body and mind. Both these elements are, as 
per tradition, conceived to be totally different from one 
another, the attribute of mind being thought, and the 
at tr ibute of body being extension. He was of the opinion 
that a disembodied mind can exist on i ts own. But the 
problem with the cartesian idea is how can two essentially 
different things like body and mind be united? Descartes 
somehow comes out with a solution that is definetly unsound. 
He says that the two are related via pineal gland in 
the brain . Notwithstanding the unsoundness of cartesian 
solution, we can discern again that there is a built-in 
tension in the very structure of the human being. The needs 
of the mind and demands of the body are definitly at 
variance with each other . And the problem is how to balance 
and harmonise the two. 
John Locke distinguishes the concept of man from 
the concept of person. A mein according to Locke is a 
certain sort of living orgeinism whose identity depaids on 
i t s biological organisation. On the other hand, he defined 
a person as "A thinking intelligent being, that has reason 
and reflection and can consider itself as itself at, different 
times and places; which i t does only by that consciousness 
7 Which is inseparable from thinking and essential to it" . A 
person according to Locke is a morally responsible agent. 
Locke thought, that what makes people accountable for their 
actions is their abil i ty to recognise them as their own. 
This means two things: f i rs t , an awareness of what one is 
doing when one is doing it and, second, an ability to 
remember having done i t . Hence, he said that the criterion 
for the identity of persons, as distinct from raai is 
consciousness, a concept intended to embrass both awareness 
and memory. Hence we discern a tension between these two 
concepts, man eind person. 
For Neitzche man has no supernatural dignity. Man's 
dignity is not a pregiven fact but a goal that few 
approach. There is no meaning in life except the meaning 
man gives to his l ife, and the aims of most mai have no 
surpassing dignity. To raise ourselves above the senseless 
flux, we must cease being merely human. We must be hard 
against ourselves and overcome ourselves; we must become 
creators instead of remaining mere creatures. For Neitzche 
human evolution is possible only through, "Suffering, being 
forsaken, profound self contempt, the torture of mistrust 
of himself and the misery of him who is overcome" . He is 
of the view that there is no other way in which one can 
attain or prove one's worth. 
In this regard ortega y Gasset has rightly pointed 
out: 
The select man is not the petulant person who 
thinks himself superior to the rest, The most 
radical division that i s possible to make of humanity is that 
which spl i t s it into two classes of creatures: Those who 
make great demands of themselves, pilling up difficulties 
and duties; and those who demand nothing special 
to themselves, but for whom to live is to be every moment 
what they already are , without imposing oa themselves 
any effort towards perfection; mere buoys that float 
on the waves. 
Thus we see that human condition for Neitzche is to 
be torn by strife and a perpetual struggle and flight 
against one self. Thus alienation is a structural feature 
of man. 
To Marx, man is destined to work for his bio-
physical survival and for the fulfilment of his other 
needs. Production is therefore the most important of all 
man's ac t iv i t ies . Man in association with other men produces 
more than man in isolation and society is thus the 
result of man's attempt to secure the necesities of life most 
efficiently. But, society has never accomplished that to the 
satisfaction of all i ts members and has, in 
consequence, always been subject to internal stresses and 
strains or subject to division into oporessors and the 
oppressed. Thus in Marx's view, man's becoming are 
exclusively the result of his existential socio-economic 
relat iveness. 
Marx holds that in the captalist form of society, 
man gets alienated from his own true nature, since the 
conditions of the capitalist society do not allow man to 
develop his real potential. Thus, in his opinion there can 
be no real change in the individual's life until there 
is a radical change in society and unless the socio-economic 
system of capitalism is topsy-tumed. And Marx thinks 
that this is bound to happen one day, for capitalism will 
wither away because of i t s inner contradictions and the 
communist revolutionary will bring in the new order of 
things in which alienation will disappear, man will be 
regenerated in his true nature, his potential will 
develop for i t s own sake and the guiding principle in the 
way and view of life will be "each according to his ability 
to each according to his needs". In short Marx"s 
man is primarly an economic being and solution to man's 
all problems and all his suffering consists in 
restructuring the economic set up. He held that human 
state is constituted by i t s material sustenance - "Man is 
9 
what he eats" . 
Freud tried to build a complete picture of man by 
working out an analysis of his unconscious urges and impulses. 
Freud 's basic thesis is that, nothing what a person does or 
says is realy haphazard or accident al; everything can, in 
principle, be traced to causes which are somehow in the 
person's mind . Freud postulated three kinds of man's mental 
states v iz . 'conscious' i . e . different kinds of our experiences 
and memories of which we are usually aware; 'unconscious' i . e . 
certain kinds of our experiences which cannot become conscious 
in normal circumstances and 'preconscious' i . e . memories of 
particular experiences or of particular facts, of which we are 
not continually conscious, but which we can call to mind 
whenever necessary. Freud also postulated three major 
structural systems with the human mind or personality; the id, 
which contains all the instinctual drives seeking immediate 
satisfaction, the ego, which deals with the real world outside 
the person, mediating betweai it and id and the superego, a 
special part of the ego which contains the conscience and the 
social norms acquired in child-hood. 
Freud further holds that the becoming of a normal 
human person depends on a harmonious relationship between 
the various parts of the mind, and between the person and 
the real world in which he has to l ive . The ego has to 
reconcile id . Super-ego and the external world, perceiving 
and choosing opportunities for satisfying the instinctual 
demands of the Id without transgressing the standards 
required by the super-ego. If the world is unsuitable and 
does not give any opportunities for satisfaction of the 
instinctual demands, there will be mental disturbances and 
hence man's sufferings. So, becoming of imperfect 
individuals, in Freud 's opinion, result from the repression or 
frustration of basic inst incts . And, the prime basic instinct 
according to Freud is sex or lust . However, he widened the 
concept of sexuality as pleasant experience derived through 
any part of the body; even love, sympathy, liking etc. 
And, finally he held that , for normal and mature development 
it is essential that each child passes through the normal 
stages of development of sexuality. Evidently, in Freud's 
view, man's becoming is primarly governed by his basic 
instinct of sex . 
For Dostoyevsky man is limited by society, 
economic conditions, laws, his tory, the Church and 
especially by god. He is classified, defined and fixed by a 
hundred institutions and a thousand conditions. Man, however 
does not want to be defined and limited, he wants to be free 
and he wants to be totally free. According to Dostoyvesky 
he is right in wanting to be free, for freedom is the 
essential attribute of his identi ty. 
10 
Dostoyevsky's free man must be a revolutionary. He 
must refuse what society, economics, religion, other 
11 people, and his own past have made of him . Golyadkin, 
the hero of the early tale The Double (1846), refuses to 
be what society and economic conditions and his own acts 
have made of him: a civil servant of a certain rank, 
living on shestilavochnaya street with a servant named 
Petrushka; someone not poor and not rich; something of a 
bootlicker, a bit of hypocrite, and a social bore. He 
revolts against this Goly—adkin by creating a double. By 
giving all his undesirable t ra i ts to the double, he is 
able to make in his mind a new identity: good, brave, 
intellignt and heroic. The Golyadkin others see is a 
mistake; the Golyadkin he cries in his mind is the true 
one: when the two come into conflict, he defends unto 
madness his freedom to reject what the past and coiditions 
have made of him and his right to create himself. 
However this freedom implies a complex and 
te r r ib le truth about the actions of men and their 
treatment of o thers . If there are no laws to one's nature-
and there ceinnot be if one i s to be free - than man alone 
is his own law. And if he is his own end, he will make 
everything else serve that end, including other people. 
Even more, every a-priori truth becomes illusion. 
Otherwise, the truth would be prior to other choices and 
11 
our choices would be determined by i t . Truth as something 
absolute, timeless, and pre-existent to our choices is 
impossible in Dostoyevesky's concept of freedom. Truth, 
l ike everything else in his world depends on our wills. 
The implications of this are terrifying; every good, 
beautiful, virtuous, reasonable act is so only in 
appearance. No matter how much naive and tender romantic 
souls may weint to believe in them, they are really 
deceptions, for the reality is man's free will and he is 
deadly duel with other free wi l ls . 
The total freedom of underground nan brought 
Dostoyeveskey to the total terror of a universe without 
t ruth or principle, good or evi l , virtue or vice. This 
n ihi l i s t ic vision of the universe was to send philosophers 
l ike L.I . Shestov and Neitzche into dark ecstasy over the 
naked power of the will, and it was also to bring 
Dostovesky to what seemed to be an irresolvable dilemma. 
Freedom is the supreme good because man is not man unless 
he is free, but freedom is also the supreme evil because 
man is free to do anything, including illimitable destruction. 
For Heidegger human being exists as anticipation of 
i t s own possibil i t ies: it exis ts in advance of itself and 
12 
grasps i ts situation as challenge to its own power of 
becoming what it may, rather than being what it must be. 
Man is always reaching out beyond himself; his very being 
consists in aiming at what he is not yet . Such a project 
of himself never outruns the boundaries of the world he 
has been given: it is a projection in and off and with the 
world. For Heidegger human existence is a shared existence. 
"I am constituted both by my preoccupations in which I 
make use of objects as tools and by my solicitude of 
12 persons". . For him self and world are inseperable. In its 
own projection, then, man at once understands his world and 
becomes himself. However, if the world is the material 
for his creative energy, it is also the agent by which he 
is seduced from the essential drive to understand and 
create. Man i s not only the world, in his creative efforts 
he loses himself to the world. According to Heidegger, 
foref light is a fundamental attribute of human being. It 
means the scattering of the essential forward drive through 
attention to the distracting and disturbing cares of every 
day and of the things and people that surround us 
every-day. Thus the forward driving, "I" is sacrificed to 
the persistent and pressing "They". Man, for Heidegger in 
i ts everyday mode is public; it is life with others and 
for o thers . In alienation from the caitral task of 
becoming oneself. Thus man is determined yet free, free 
13 
yet enslaved. It is not the case that only heredity and 
environment make msin, these are conversly what man makes 
of them. Freedom lives in the tension of history, in the 
challenge of man's situation, his body, his family, his 
country. But freedom lives equally in the tension of the 
unhistorical, the purely present - the passing mood, the 
flight of the self from itself. 
To Sartre man is free as he cannot be otherwise. 
He cannot escape his freedom, which becomes for him, 
therefore, a dreadful responsibi l i ty. But not only does 
one determine himself in his free choice; he also 
determines all others for every decision he makes legislates for 
13 
all men . Man is involved inevitably in anguish 
because his decision is never grounded in an external 
authority upon which he can rest the responsibility for 
his action. He must bear it alone. And when Sartre 
says alone, for not only is there no God to share the 
burd«i , but there is no structure a - priori for values to 
rest upon. Man's forlomess is his all aloneness in which 
he must face the issue of his own freedom. That God 
does not exist is a dreadful fact that makes an ultimate 
difference to the world and to man. 
The discovery that there i s no God and that man is 
alone is the beginning of a genuine humanism that 
14 
dignifies man as the free creator of all values and of 
whatever meaning there is in human existence. Sartre 
holds: "There is no human nature which can be taken as 
foundational. Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he 
exists only, in so far as he realises himself; he is 
therefore, nothing else but the sum of his actions, 
14 
nothing else but what his life is" 
He asser ts that: "What man needs is to find 
himself again and to understand that nothing can save him 
from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence 
of God"^^. 
For Iqbal too existence is a continuous process 
£ind not a system. His philosophy is based upon a theory of 
man. He regards human existence as an open reeility. Iqbal 
agrees with the existentialists that the traditional 
philosophy has failed to grasp the very reality of human 
existence because of i ts intellectualistic analytical 
approach. Man is unanalysable, unpredictable and free, 
always an open possibi l i ty . His philosophy maintains that 
man is never complete. 
"Take this message from me to the Sufils: Ye are 
seeking God through the subtleties of thought; I shall serve as 
a slave the man who worships himself and who sees God in the 
1 fi 
light of his own personality" 
15 
Iqbal holds that man is the goal of l ife 's carvan. 
He is self-contained, centre of act ivi ty, creative and self-
evolving. In defiance of God, Iqbal 's man is destined 
to be a rival creator addressing 'The best of all creators ' : 
Thou didst create the night and I made the lamp. 
Thou didst create clay and I made the cup. 
Thou didst create the deser ts , mountains and forests. 
I produced the orchards, gardens and groves; 
It is I who turn stone into a mirror. 
17 And it is I who turn poison into an antidote . 
Iqbal emphasises two essait ial attributes of man 
v i z . freedom and creat iv i ty . He also touched the problem of 
two fold alienation - God alienated from man and man 
alienated from God. In 'Shikwa' (The complaint), Iqbal had 
already raised the same issue: why is man alienated from 
God? In 'Jawab-e-Shikwa' (Answer to the complaint) Gods 
reply seems to be not satisfactory, because alienation is 
not God's problem; it is exclusively human problem. Iqbal 
considered it an opportunity to unfold man's all 
possibil i t ies and develop all his potentialities. It was 
for him, freedom and creativity that urged man to leave the 
innert static life of heaven, devoid of all passions 
16 
and act iv i t ies . Hence social life is not opposed to 
religious life, but an integral part of i t . Social and 
Religious experiences form the totality of human 
existence. It is due to th is approach that Iqbal could 
meet the challenge of social meaninglessness and religious 
alienation simultaneously on the level of existential 
experiences. 
Man evolves his own world, creates his own values. 
If the present world renders no meaning to human existence, 
it is to be destroyed and reshaped: 
Smash the world into pieces if it does not suit 
thee; And bring forth another world from the 
depths of thy being. It is irritating for a free 
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man to live in a world made by others . 
Iqbal holds that: 
In the higher Sufism of Islam unitive experience 
is not the finite ego effacing i ts own identity by some 
sort of absorption into the infinite eg; it is rather the 
19 infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite . 
Flnitude is not a misfortune. Islam does not teach 
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complete liberation from finitude . Man is the trustee of 
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a free personality at his per i l . Freedom is man's own 
choice. He is neither condemned to be free, nor does he 
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receive freedom as a gift from the transcendence. To Iqbal 
God speaks through freedom. He does not regard a slave's 
prayer as genuine, because a slave is not free to 
communicate with God. Prayer is the means to attain 
immortality. Only a free being can transcend space-time 
l imits . Freedom means self-transcendence to be what a man 
is not at present. It is creativi ty. 
Iqbal holds that being is always individual, their is 
not universal being. By being he means life of ego. 
Augustine recognizes three planes of being: body, 
soul and God. As soul controls body, so does God control 
22 the soul, to what He is in the closest proximity . For 
Saint Augestine man's evidence for knowing that he himself 
exists functions as a pre-condition. According to him, man 
can soundly affirm his own existence on the ground of the 
famous formula, repeated in one form or another in several 
of his works. Si faller, sum, "If I am deceived, I 
exis t" . 
Through the inner empirical method, man can 
realize that he possesses reason and that this possession 
makes him superior to inorganic beings, plants and 
animals. Also through inner empricism man can not only 
recognise his own mutability, but can as well realize the 
existence of the immutable and unchanging; that which is 
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Superior to himself. Saint Augestine cannot see in this 
truth anything other than God, who has granted men these 
inner powers, this Divine illumination, whereby God 
himself can be known, and all the complex relations of the 
creation can be understood. Thus the mind can know that 
God is the creator of the "natures" which can be perceived 
in the world of sense-experience and they in turn can be 
dealt with in their true character, because inner 
experience with i ts guarantee of Divine illumination makes it 
23 possible for the mind to view them on their proper lights. 
To Augestine man's free will is the source of man's 
imperfection but man was caoable of being perfect. Man, not 
God is responsible; and he is so, even if God forsaw that 
free man would sin. 
Man has fallen, and with man's fall evil has 
entered the world. In Adam all men sinned, i . e . Adam's sin 
was not a mere event in the life of one man but was a cosmic 
revolution, a world rebelling against its creator. 
With the fall man was lost . Man is lost and no human power 
can save him. Left to himself, man can but sin, for his 
true freedom has gone. God alone can save man by His 
grace. Man must be redeemed and God alone can redeem him. 
The world is evil and is lost; men are evil s t i l l , 
hundreds of years after the Christ has come. Such is not 
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the divine plan. God chooses whom he shall save and whom 
he shall leave to their s in. But is not salvation free to 
all to choose or not to choose ? No; man cannot even choose 
to be saved, for man is hopelessly corrupt. If he is saved, 
it i s all Gods will. The agent by which this salvation is 
consummated is the grace of God working through the church. 
Without the church there is no means of salvation. Thus the 
church is conceived not as a society within the world but 
as a wonderful cosmic entity coming from God having supreme 
control over the destiny of man. It is thus superior to the 
state and to all other human institutions. It is the city 
of God descended from heaven. The church and the angels 
constitute the great intermediary between the ultimate God 
and the cosmos; and they thus correspond to the 
intermediary powers and stages believed in by the whole 
intellectual world of the Greco-Roman period. 
For Augestine the choice for a man was always 
between a life of detached action or an over-indulgence 
into the ways of flesh and camel desires. One was the life 
of heroic withdrawl and consequent self-exaltation and 
redemption while the other was the life of slaverv of lust 
and sensual pleasure. The antipodal stations of life could 
be expressed by any of the contrasting terms like 'City of 
God' and "City of Earth or City of Rome and City of 
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Jerusalam etc ." While elaborating on the significance of 
these dichotomoies, at one place he movingly wrote : 
" ye have heard and know that there are two 
ci t ies , for the present outwardly mingled together, yet 
separated at hear t , running together through the course of 
time until the end; one whose end is everlasting peace, 
and it is called Jerusalam; the other whose joy is peace in 
the world, and is called Babylon, The meaning of these 
names too ye remember, that Jerusalam means 'vision of 
peace ' ; Babylon, 'Confusion' Jerusalam was held capitive in 
Babylon, but not all for the Angels too are its citizens. 
But as regards men predestined to the glory of God....which 
began thus : 
For thee, 0 God, a hymn is meet in Sion, and to 
thee 
today 
sat 
sha l l 
we 
down 
be 
h a v e 
and 
vow be performed 
sun, By the 
wep t . when 
in 
waters 
he 
Jerusalam. 
of Babylon 
remembered 
But 
we 
Sion. 
Observe, that in the former it is said. For thee, 
0 God, a hymn is meet in Sion; but her, by the 
waters of Babylon we sa-t down and wept, when we 
remembered Sion, that Sion where a hymn is meet for 
God.^^ 
According to Ibn 'Arab i ' , man consists of three 
elements : Spir i t , soul and body. The three aspects of the 
soul are the rational, vegetative and animal. The rational 
soul Ibin 'Arabi seems to identity with spirit or the 
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rational principle in man. The purpose of the vegetative 
soul is to seek food and to assimilate i t . The animal soul 
has i ts seat in the physical heart and is shared by man and 
animals. It represents their vital principle. Both 
vegetative and animal soul Ibn 'Arabi regards as part of 
the body. The rational soul, on the other hand is 
independent of the body, even though it uses it as a 
vehicle . It is ' that perfect and simplest substance which 
is living and active, the substance whose sole activities 
are remembering, retaining, ideas, conprehending, 
discriminating and reflecting. 
Viewed superficially, Ibn ' Arabi's division into 
spi r i t and body (rationality and animaliity) might wear a 
look of dualism. In actual fact both spirit and body are, 
for him, facets of the same central Reality, one being its 
inward, the other its outward aspect . 
Actually Ibn 'Arabi transformed Hallaj's theory of 
incarnation which states that "God created Adam in his own 
image". He distinguished between two natures of man : the 
divine (al-lahut) and the human (al-nasut). The two nature 
are not united but fused, the one into the other, as wine is 
fused into water. The Hallajian idea was given a wider 
application by Ibn Arabi. F i rs t , the duality of lahut and 
Nasut became a duality of aspects of one reality, not of 
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two independent natures. Secondly they were regarded as 
actually present not only in man but in everything 
whatever; the Nasut being the external aspect of a thing, 
the lahut, i t s internal aspect. But God who reveals Himself 
in all phenomenal existence is revealed in a most perfect 
and complete way in the form of the perfect man, who is 
best represented by prophets and saints. 
So man in general-and the perfect man in particular 
is the most perfect manifestation of God. The universe 
which, like a mirror, reflects the divine attributes and 
names in a multiplicity of forms, manifests them 
separately. Man alone manifests these attributes and names 
colectively. Hence he is called the microcosm and the 
honoured epitome (al-mukhtasar al-Sharif) and the most 
universal being (al-Kaun al Jami) who comprises all 
reali t ies and grades of existence. In him alone the divine 
presaice is reflected, and through him alone God become 
conscious of himself and his perfection. 
Ibn 'Arabi says : 
"God, glory to Him, in respect of His most 
beautiful names, which are beyond aiumeration, willed to 
see their a'yan ( rea l i t ies ) , or if you wish you may say. 
His (own) 'ayn, in a universal Being which contains the 
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whole affair in as much as it is endowed with all asoects 
of existence and through which (alone) His mystery is 
revealed to Himself : for a vision which consists in a 
thing seeing itself by means of itself is not the same as that 
of the thing seeing something else which serves as a 
m i r r o r . . . .Adam was the very essence of the polishing of this 
mirror, and the spir i t of this form ( i . e . , the form in which 
27 God has revealed Himself : which is man)" 
Man deserves the high honour and dignity of being 
God's vicegerent on earth - a rank which God has denied 
all other creatures including the angels. This superior 
rank goes not to every individual man, for some men are 
even lower than the beasts, but to the perfect man alone, and 
this for two reasons : 
a) He is perfect manifestation of God in virtue of 
unity in himself, or all God's attributes and names. 
b) He knows God absolutely through realizing in some 
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sort of experience his essential oneness with him. 
According to Buddha, the idea of self is an 
imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding reality 
and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine' , 
selfish des i re , craving, attachement, hatred, ill-health, 
conceit, pr ide egoism and other defilements, impurities, 
and problems. It is the source of all troubles in the 
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world from personal conflicts to wars between nations. In 
short , to this false view can be traced all the evil in the 
world. 
The Buddhist doctrine of anatta, with the rejection 
of the notion of the immortal soul within man, serves to 
dispel the illusion of the egocentric ' I ' , which is , as 
Buddha taught, the root cause of all evil . To Buddha "There 
is no self in man, however spelt or described, which is 
unchanging and his alone". The self or soul exists as a 
convenient concept to describe an ever-changing bundle of 
character is t ics , each the product of innumerable past 
causes, which moves in the illusion of time towards 
29 Nirvana . The Buddha analyses the components of 
personality and proved each to be empty. In the first place 
Buddhism examines the various aspects of the so called 
person (Puggata) and contends, by minutely analysing them, 
that none of them can be idKitified with the atman, and 
that no atman can be found when the person is so analysed. 
The person is first analysed under two categories : 
Naraa and Rupa. Nama ( l i teral ly Name), is usually translated 
into English by the word 'mind ' , but in Buddhist psychology 
it is used as a collective name to refer to the 
phychological and mental aspects of human being. Rupa 
( l i tera l ly form), translated into a English by the word 
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(matter, body), is also a collective term to descrioe tr.9 
physical aspect of being. Thus Namarputa (Name and For-, 
taken together comprise the psychoDhysical organism whicn 
constitutes a person as a separate and distinct individual. 
It is extremely important to note that Buddhism does 
not think of Nama and Rupa in dualistic terms. They are 
interdependent and belong to each other in a integral manner. 
One cannot exist without the other. The idea is exoressed 
in the following verse : 
As a pair are mind and body both 
To one another a support; 
As soon as one of them dissoslves. 
The other too does d i s a p p e a r . . . . 
As men are able with a ship 
To cross the waters of the sea. 
Just so supported by this body 
The mind keeps going on and on. 
And just as with the help of men 
The ship may cross the mighty sea 
Just so supported by the mind 
The body may be keeping on. 
As men and ship t raverse the sea. 
Depending on each others ' help. 
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So are the mind and body too, 
30 EAch other they support and help. 
The division of man into the two categories, Nama 
and Rupa, is only the first step in the Buddhist analysis 
of self. The next step is the analysis of man into the five 
Khandhas (aggregation). This is the classic 'thervada 
psmcakkhandha' theory, according to which the individual 
consists of (1) Rupa, (2) Vedana, (3) Sanna, (4) Sarnkhara 
and (5) Vinnana. The last four are sub-divisions of Nama. 
Altogether there are eighty-one basic elements with 
the addition of the element of space (Akaso) which is 
counted as one of the rupa elements. None of these elements 
is permanent. Hence there is no soul, when the five 
aggregates come together they take a certain form and what is 
thus formed is given a name. Thus we have 'name and 
form' (nama-rupa) but when the elements disintegrate there 
is no nama-rupa, no person, no ego. 
Regarding the impersonality and emptiness of the five 
aggretages it is said : 
Whatever there is of corporeality, feeling, 
perception, mental formation and consciousness, whether 
past , present or future, one 's own or external, gross or 
subtle, lofty or low, far or near; this , one should 
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understand according to reality and true wisdom : This does 
not belong to me. This I am not, this is not my Ego. 
However, besides the above discussed conflicting 
theories, on concept of man, there are certain systems of 
belief e .g . , Christanity, Islam, Hinduism etc . , which are 
embodied in man's ways of living in different parts of the 
world. They being practically lived and adopted, are thus 
more than mere theories. These systems of belief claim 
essential truth about human nature e.g. Christianity holds 
that man is made in the image of God. For each nan is free 
to accept or reject God's purpose and will be judged 
according to how he exercises this freedom. To the question 
as to why God created man, Christianity answers that God 
willed not to be alone. He wanted to realise His essaice 
i . e . love in meeting with another being, man, through its 
own free love. To account for man's sufferings and problems, 
Christanity says that the world is not in accordance with 
God's purpose, that man's relationship to God is disrupted. 
Man misuses his freedom, he rejects God and is thus 
infected with Sin. 
On the other hand, in Indian culture there are 
various trends on concept of man. The Charv-akas. for 
example, l ike materialists, hold that man is a bio-phvsical 
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entity, who has evolved from matter. In their opinion, 
enjoyment of pleasure is the only sensible purpose of life. 
Mahayana Buddhism (Vijnanavadins) treats 'consciousness' as 
the metaphysical essence of man, whereas to the Hinayana 
school, man is aggregate of five Skandhas i . e . Sensation, 
consciousness. Name, impression and Form. However, other 
schools of Indian Philosophy along with Jainism regard man 
as a unity of two sides i . e . the 'Natural' and the 
' s p i r i t u a l ' . By 'natural ' i s meant the biophysical and 
psychological processes stemming from the body-mind complex 
and the ' sp i r i t ua l ' , the real essence of man which is 
self-explanatory. Further, man as a unity of these two 
s ides , has been understood as characterised by the unique 
' I ' - feeling' . This unreflective 'I feeling' explains 
man's identification with the body-mind complex and things 
of the external world. 
According to Indian thought the basic factor behind 
man's coming into wordly existence and becoming of a 
certain kind of human person, is his own Karmas of the past 
l ives and of the present l i fe. There is a two-fold 
fructification of all Karmas in man's life. Firstly every 
action performed with a desire produces its direct results, 
the direct results of our past Karmas is that, they 
determine the nature of b i r th , family, society, position 
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etc. In this case there is no choice. But, our oast deeds 
also produce indirect results in us i . e . tendencies or 
dispositions, (Sanskaras or Vasans) which promote us to act 
in certain ways. But, they do not compel. They may be 
checked and controlled. Thus according to Indian 
religiophilosophical thought, inspite of the initial 
determination of man's present life, man can make attempts 
to shape himself as he wil ls . 
Islamic philosophy of man is also set within 
Semitic frame-work. The Quran maintains that man has been 
created with a view to realize certain values and 
standards, the fore-most value being man's coraolete 
surrender to the will of Allah. Allah created man in His 
own image. He inducted His own spirit into a clay model 
and thus the most conscious and self-conscious agent viz. 
Man was created. Allah is nearer to man than his own 
jugular vein. Man was precisely created to celebrate the 
Draises of Almightly Allah and thus achieve highest 
spiritual excellence and fel ici ty. Man has to go through 
t rai ls and tribulations but he must not despair of the mercy 
of God. Ultimately it is the believer in Allah who is really 
successful and on the day of judgement, he will be 
judiciously and graciously rewarded by His creator and 
Master i . e . Allah. 
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As a whole, what may be concluded from the above 
discussion is that the Dharma-centric theories of the 
traditional thinkers are as mistaken as the Kama-centric 
theory of Freud and the Artha-centric theory of Marx in 
understanding the nature of man. These approaches are 
limited and fail to understand man in his total 
perspect ive. They try to understand man from the same 
single aspect i . e . of the nature of Kama or Artha or Dharma 
or from some metaphysical presuppositions and as a result, 
their conclusions veil not only other dimensions of man but 
also the wholeness of man. These theories at the most, 
attempt to give a description of what man i s , they do not 
take into account all dimensions of man and more 
part icular ly, the aspiring dimension of man i . e . what man 
wants to be or seeks to be. But then, any theory of humein 
nature, if it is true to itself, has to be a theory of human 
l ife, not of one part , or one aspect of l ife. Neither can 
it be a mere logical postulation or speculation of an 
individual life or of human species. It has to be a 
complete explanation of the human mode of being and 
existence. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF ALIENATION 
Man has never been such a problem to himself as in 
the present age. Present age is a Self-concious age. The 
deepest problems of modem life justify the claim of an 
individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality 
of h is existence in the face of crushing social forces, 
historical heritage, cultural ethos and above all technocentric 
l ife-world. In the act of fleeing with nature which 
primitive man has to wage for his bodily existence attains 
in th is modem form i ts latest transformation. The 
eighteenth century called upon man to free himself of all 
historical bonds in politics and religion and in morals and 
economics. In addition to greater l iberty, the ninteenth 
century demanded the functional specialization of man and his 
work. This specialization makes one individual incomparable 
to another, and each of them indispensable to the highest 
possible extent. 
Our present age of pessimism, despair and 
uncertainty follows a quite different earlier period of 
optimism, hope and certainty - a period when man believed in 
himself and the work of his hands; had faith in the powers 
of reason and science, trusted his gods, and conceived his 
own capacity for growth as endless and his widening horizons 
32 
l imit less. Bold in his desires of freedom, equality, social -
justice and brotherhood, he thought that ignorance alone 
stood in the way of these des i res . But conflict of emotions 
and violence have unseated traditional beliefs and values. 
Knowledge has spread, but it has not abolished 
warfare; nor has it made all men brothers. Instead, men 
find themselves more isolated, anxious and uneasy than ever. 
Confused as to his place in the scheme of a world 
growing each day closer yet more impersonal, more densely 
populated yet in face to face relations more dehumanized; a 
world appealing ever more widely for his concern and 
sympathy with unknown masses of men, yet fundaiientally 
alienating him even from his next neighbour, today man has 
become mechcinized, made comfortable as an object but in 
the profound sense displaced and thrown off balance as a 
subjective creator and power. Modem man is neither 
nostalgic to his oast nor optimistic about future; he is 
just dissatisfied with 'present ' - i . e . every thing that 
makes up his ethos - his philosophy and science, his 
religion and technology, his polit ics and ethics etc. He is 
disoriented, uncommitted, cynical, hopless and what not. 
This entire cluster of modem attitudes is what we call 
ALIENATION. The word alienation has an ancient history, 
being used in common discourse to identify feelings of 
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estrangement, or of detachment from self and from others; 
and in law to describe the act of transferring property or 
ownership to another. Actually the terra alienation implies a 
subject and an object - the former being a constant and the 
lat ter being a var iable . The subject, i . e . , the alienated, 
individual and the object what one is alienated from, that 
may be an individual 's self, another person, any institution, 
the whole society or cosmos or even God. 
In modem terms, however, "Alienation" has beai 
used by philosophers, psychologis ts , men of literature and 
sociologists to refer to an extraordinary variety of 
psycho-social disorders ; including loss of self-anxiety 
s ta tes , psychosis* despair , depersonalization 
rootlessness, apathy, social disorganization, loneliness, 
atomization, powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, 
pessimism and the loss of beliefs or values. Theologians and 
philosophers warn that advances in scientific knowledge do 
not enable us to penetrate the mystery of Being and do not 
bridge but often widen the gulf between the knower and the 
reali ty he t r ies to understand; psychiatrists try to help 
their patients return from the world of illusion to reality; 
cr i t ics of the increasing mechanization of life challenge 
the optimistic expectation that technological progress 
will automatically lead to the enrichment of human lives; 
political scientists note that even democratic institutions 
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have failed to bring about genuine participation by the 
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masses in the great issues of our period." 
Whatever the approach, central to definition of 
alienation is the idea that man has lost his identity or 
"Selfhood". Many writers who deal with the problems of 
"Self-alienation assume that in each of us there is a 
"genuine", "real" or "spontaneous" self which we are 
prevented from knowing or achieving. But how does one 
achieve selfhood? The most satisfactory answer has been 
provided by Social Psychologists, notably charless H. Cooley 
and George H. Mead, who argued that one acquires a self or 
identity through interaction with others . Coolev called this 
a process of acquiring a "looking-glass se l f and Mead 
termed it "taking the role of the other". But if one 
acquires a self by communicating with others, especially 
through lanaguage, then anxiety about or loss of self-hood is 
a social as well as an individual problem. What this means 
is that the person who experiences self-alienation is not 
only cut off from the springs of which he would otherwise be 
a part , and who fails to achieve a meaningful relationshio 
with others but he is deprived of some part of hi^iself. 
Simmel, who has considerably influenced 
contemporary philosophy and sociology both in Europe and in 
the United States, has expressed in his works the mood of 
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skepticism which arose in the first decades of this 
century. His essay "Der Konflikt der Modemen Kultur" 
reflects the growing fear - in our day reiterated by the 
4 
existentialists - that man cannot be himself. He is 
destined to remain a stranger in the world in which he 
l ives . 
According to Simmel, an inner conflict, stemming 
from the antagonism between life and form, can be se«i in 
the development of most civil izations. The creative movemait 
of life in a civilization tends to express itself in law, 
technology, ar t , science and religion. Although the purpose 
of these expressions is to implement and to protect the life 
which generated them, they reveal an immanent tendency to 
follow a direction, independent of and divorced from the 
energies of life which brought them into being. At the 
moment of their emergence they might correspond to the life 
which created them; but as they unfold they appear to fall 
into unyielding disconnection, even into a state of 
opposition. They are bound to bcome rigid, to stand by 
themselves. Thus they tend to acquire cwitinuity in a word 
they become Forms. 
Without these forms the creative life could not 
have become manifest. It continuously produces them. Yet it 
keeps on flowing l ike a ceaseless stream, forever 
producing new forms but immediately opposing them in their 
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solidity and permanence. Thus, rapidly or slowly, the 
energies of life gnaw at every cultural formation, once it 
has emerged. As one formation evolves its successor develops 
beneath it and eventually, after a short or a lengthy 
struggle, replaces i t . 
This perennial opposition between life and form -
Simmel believes for reasons which he does not analyze - is 
intensified and enhanced in our age. For Simmel the cult of 
life has deeply influenced the philosophical outlook of our 
age. He sees every period in history as producing one 
specific idea which dominates that era as its secret 
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king . In classical Greece this Specific idea was the idea 
of Being; in the middle ages, the Idea of God; in 
Renaissance, (14th - 16th centuries), the idea of Nature; and in 
the seventeenth century, the idea of Natural law. During the 
eighteenth century the Individual becomes the central theme; and 
in the twentieth century the concept of Life excels all others in 
i t s appeal to us and i t s influence upon our outlook. 
To show that the conflict between Form and Life has 
reached even the most personal and intimate aspects of hunian 
relations, Simmel describes the development of attitudes 
towards sex under the impact of modem civilization. There 
are many such reflections of contemporary man's fear that 
his individuality will be destroyed, that he is living under 
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conditions which compel him to become estranged from his own 
self. There are numerous indications that this 
apprehension is one of the decisive forces in the thinking 
of modem man and that accounts for the strong appeal of 
existential philosophy. Individual should become that which 
he i s , even if this commitment to his own self, to his 
"authentic existence", means that he had to accept the fate 
of the lonely "outsider" . 
Existential philosophy is essaitially a revolt 
against the belief deeply rooted in the development of 
modem thought, that truth can be ascertained only through 
detachment, that the cognitive act requires a radical 
seperation between the knower, represented as the subject, 
and the reali ty to be known, represented as the object. 
Already in the nineteaith century there could be heard the 
voices of a few lonely thinkers who recognized the danger 
lying in the split between subject and object. Kierkegaard 
expressed his disdain for the merely "cognitive subject", 
whom he confronted with the existential thinker. He argued 
that "knowledge has a relationship to the knower, who is 
essentially an existing individual, sind that for this reason 
all essai t ia l knowledge is essentially related to 
existence". A thinker as different from Kierkegaard as 
Feuerbach insisted : "Do not wish to be a philosopher in 
contrast to being a man do not think as a 
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thinker think as a living, real being think 
7 
m Existence . 
Among the first to concern themselves with 
self-alienation as a general condition were Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche in their respectively despairing and angry tracts 
about the nothingness or selflessness that yawned before men in 
a technological, secular, and materialistic society. Thus 
Kierkegaard who felt that the self could only be preserved 
by identification with God, spoke of godless man's essaitial 
dread at being dominated by an alien power which threatens 
our dissolution - by which he meant anxiety that loss of 
self can produce. Despair about loss of self he called a 
"sickness unto Death". Nietzsche however, proclaimed the 
death of the gods but asked, "Do we not now wander through 
an endless nothingness?" More recently Karl Jaspers has 
written : "what, in all the millenniums of human history and 
pre-his tory , no god has been able to do for man, man has 
done for himself. It is natural enough that in these 
achievements of his he should discern the true inwardness of 
being - until he shrinks back in alarm from the void he has 
made for himself". The problem which Jaspers raises is 
whether man can preserve his selfhood or identity in a world 
dominated by a grand technological and oureaucratic 
"apparatus" of his own creation, yet alien to him. The price 
we pay for "progress", he suggests, is anxiety, "a dread of 
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life perhaps unparalleled in i ts intensity" and increasing 
"to such a pitch that the sufferer may feel himself to be 
nothing more than a lost point in empty space, in as much as 
all human relationships appear to have no more than a 
o 
temporary validi ty" . 
Husserl differentiated, between existentia and 
essentia and it became a gripping message for an age that 
had grown aware of the separation between subject and 
object. Husserl is concerned with ess«ices and our 
knowledge of them. It is true, Husserl says, that we cannot 
reach them by means of sensory perception. But he suggests 
that we l iberate ourselves from the positivistic prejudice 
which recognizes only those experiences as valid that have 
been acquired by sensory perception. If we overcome this 
narrowness Husserl says, we shall realize that essences can 
be made experienceable, that they can be grasped and "seen" 
intuit ively. This visualization of essences has nothiing to do 
with a sudden revelation and is not an easy task. It can be 
achieved by difficult preparation, which Husserl 
calls phenomenological reduction. The objective of 
phenoraenological reduction is to suspend all consideration 
of the existing world to put the factual into brackets. This 
can be achieved, Husserl bel ieves, because man's mind has 
the power to differentiate between existentia and essentia, 
to set aside existences, and to attain pure consciousness 
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of essences. 
It was hoped that in the intuitive grasping of 
essences a way had been found to bridge the gulf between 
subject and object, but soon it was felt unsatisfactory as 
Hesserls program did not help to bridge the gap between 
man's mind and the outside world. Existential philosphers 
opposed Husserl 's seperation of essence and existences, his 
claim that we can grasp the essence of objects regardless of 
whether they actually exis t . They emphasized that the 
concept of essence is a static one and can be applied only 
to those forms of reality which are characterized by a fixed 
and unchangeable nature. All attempts to describe nan by 
explaining his essence will result in reducing him to a 
thing, as evidenced by Descarte's definition of man as 
rescogitus, a thing that thinks. Such an approach overlooks the 
fact that man differs from an object in that he is not 
predetermined by properties but creates himself through his 
qual i t ies , he is what he spontaneously decides to be. 
Though the leading exponents of existential 
philosophy differ in many of their ideas, they all stress 
the view that human self does not coincide with the 
individual ' s basic propert ies . Human being is capable of 
breaking away from and transcending i ts own properties, and 
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even external conditions of i ts environment. In his essay 
"La Republique du Silence", Sartre has written a few 
sentences which not only describe the attitude of his 
countrymen during the Nazi occupation of France but convey 
at the same time the indeterrainistic orientation of 
existentialist thought : 
We were never more free than during the German 
occupation. We had lost all our rights, 
beginning with the right to talk. Everyday we 
were insulted to our faces and had to take it 
in silence. Under one pretext or another, as 
workers, Jews or Political prisoners, we 
were deported EN MASSE. Every where, on 
bi l lboards, in the newspapers on the screen, 
we encounter the revolting and insipid picture 
of ourselves that our oppressors wanted us to 
accept. And, because all of this , we were 
free. Because the Nazi venom speed even into 
our thoughts, every accurate thought was a 
conquest. Because an all-powerful police tried 
to force us to hold our tongues, every word 
look on the value of a declaration of 
principles . Because we were hunted down, every 
one of our gestures had the weights of a solemn 
commitment And the Choice that 
each of us made of his size and of his being 
was an authentic choice because it was made 
face to face with death, because it could 
always have been expressed in these terms : 
"Rather death than " And here I am not 
speaking of the elite among us who were real 
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Resistants, but of all Frenchmen who, 
every hour of the night and day throughout 
four years , answered no Thus the basic 
questions of l iberty itself was posed, and we 
were brought to the verge of the deepest 
knowledge that man can have a himself. For the 
secret of a man is not his inferiority 
complex : it is the limit of his own liberty, 
his capacity for resisting torture and 
death . 
Ortega Y Gasset, has stated that the static meaning of 
the term "to be" makes it entirely inadequate to describe 
man's existence. We cannot say, he insists, that man "is" 
but only that he is on the way to be this or that . This 
formulation expresses well the meaning of the 
existentialists view that the core of man's existence is 
possibi l i ty . For them existence is being which in every 
movement transcends itself, which since it is directed 
toward the future, is constantly in advance of itself. Thus 
they consider man's existence as his concern to become what 
he is and to be what he has to become. Heidegger and also 
the French existential ists proclaim the paradox that man, in 
order to exist , has to throw himself towards his own being. 
Therefore they call his existence a project and that project 
has nothing to do with a conscious or rationally designed 
plan : instead it indicates that man's existence has to move 
beyond itself in order to move towards itself. 
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And if existence is nothing but possibility, man's 
destiny is a hard one. At every moment he faces various 
alternatives between which he has to choose. This 
constitutes his freedom, but it thrusts upon him a 
frightening burden of responsibil i ty. He is forced into 
cruel situations, in which a decision for any of the various 
possibil i t ies will reveal the close relationship between 
freedom and quiet. Thus man does not cherish his 
sovereignty, which not only enables but compels him to make his 
own choices. He feels himself condemned to be free 
(Sar t re) . He t r ies to avoid a state of being in which he 
must ceaselessly decide for himself. But when man seeks to 
evade the decisions with which he is faced, he is really 
attempting to escape from his own self. He tries to escape 
what he cannot escape what he is . Yet so deep is 
his anguish that he feels himself driven to slip away into a 
world in which he is not any longer committed to his own 
self but can follow the choices of "the others", of that 
anonymous collective which is called "they". This is a 
totally depersonalized way of being, so general and 
inarticulate that Heidegger characterizes it by using the 
German pronoun man i . e . fallen state of mans — a most 
impersonal and neutral term, meeining "one of many" or 
day-to-day being. It is well fitted to reveal the innermost 
nature of a world where every-one is "the other one" and 
nobody is his own self, and where the meaning of the 
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personal pronoun has been lost to such an extent that 
statement l ike "I think", "I prefer", "I act" have become 
12 
empty forms 
Heidegger believes that if man tends to flee from 
himself and to plunge from the height of solitude into the 
public lowlands of the many we should not see in this fall a 
descent into inquietude and c r i s i s . Quite the contrary : "to 
exist simply as one of the many" exercises a profoundly 
appeasing influence as if everything was in the best 
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order . Tempting as th is appeasment i s , man cannot obtain 
it without paying a high pr ice . He must cease to be himself, 
he must become estranged from his own self, that is 
authentic self. 
Heidegger and most of the existential philosophers 
offer us a more gloomy picture of human existence. Man is 
alienated from real i ty, as the result of a split between 
subject and object which detached knowledge does not heal 
but deepens. He is estranged from himself, because in flight 
from himself he lets his existence be thrusted down into the 
inauthenticity of the anonymous crowd. The alienated person 
is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any 
other person. 
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History offers plentiful evidence that men in times 
past also felt no small uncertainty about themselves and 
thei r identi t ies , suffered no l i t t le anguish of gloom, 
despair and feelings of detachment from each other. Karl 
Jaspers quotes an Egyptian chronicler of four thousand years 
age: "Robbers abound No one ploughs the land. 
People are saying: "We do not know what will happen from day 
to day Dirt prevails everywhere, and no longer 
does any one wear clean raiment The country is 
spining round and round l ike a po t te r ' s wheel slave -
women are searing necklaces of gold and lapis lazuli 
No more do we hear any one laugh Great men and 
small agree in saying : ' would that I had never been 
bom' No public office stands open where it should, 
and the, masses are l ike timid sheep without a shephered. . . . 
Artists have ceased to play their art the few stay 
the many one who yesterday was indigent is 
now wealthy, and the sometime rich over-whelaa him with 
adulation Impudence is rife Oh that man 
could cease to be, that women should no longer conceive and 
give b i r th . Then, at length, the world would find 
peace" 
We see a similar moral collapse in Greece during 
the peloponnesian war. As for medieval Europe, Huizinga 
reminds us that the middle ages were essentially violent in 
46 
character: wars, class - struggles, hysterical crowd 
behaviour, vice and crime, plagues, scarcity, suoerstition, 
the conviction that the world was coming to an end - such 
was the "black" background of medieval life. A late Tiedieval-
fifteenth century French poet, Eustache Deschamps, cried: 
Why are times so dark 
Men know each other not at al l . 
But governments quite clearly change 
From bad to worse? 
Days dead and gone were more worth while 
Now that holds sway? Deep gloom and Boredoa, 
Justice and law nowhere to be found 
I know no more where I belong. 
I know no more where I belong. Is this not the 
alienated lament of all ages. 
Lewis Mimford writes, "The unattached person during 
the middle Ages was one either condemned to exile or doomed 
to death: if a l ive , he immediately sought to attach himself, 
at least to a band of robbers . To exist, one had to belong to 
an association: a house-hold, a manor, a monastery, a 
guild; there was no security except in association, and no 
freedom that did not recognize the obligations of a 
corporate l ife. One lived and died in the style of one's 
class and corporation". Moreover, as Herbert Muller notes. 
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"Men had known a kind of psychological security; they took 
for granted all the actual insecurity of life in a vale of 
,.15 tears" 
It is the historical emergence of individual as we 
know him, of man alone, that makes alienation so crucially a 
modem problem. In the past, men felt anxiety or despair 
particularly when they lost the status that identified them 
and offered them some security. But when the medieval system 
collapsed, the likelihood of alienation increased 
appreciably. Indeed, only with the release of the 
individual from medieval bonds could alienation become a 
widespread social problem. "The breakdown of the feudal 
order forced man to fall back upon himself; he had to leam 
how to cope with countless problems and decisions that were 
once taken care of by worldly and spiritual hierarchies. 
But together with the anxieties generated by this new 
autonomy he sensed a great promise, for in the period of the 
formation of the national state and the development of a 
mercantile economy his own future seemed to have infinite 
possibi l i t ies . At the end of the curve, in our own century, 
he begins to feel threatened by the encroachment of powerful 
social forces emanating not only from his own comer of the 
earth but from every part of a contracting world" . 
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Historically one of the first Tiajor results of 
mechanization was to transform labour; what had formerly 
been an integral part of human life became a means to an 
end. To feed eind operate the machines of the new 
civilization required not just raw materials but "free" 
labour. Since industrialism was pioneered by capitalists 
th is meant a special kind of freedom. And for a man to be 
treated as commodity a brutal operation was required: the 
"freeing" of labour from traditional bonds of craft, family 
and community. Thus one of the many tragic ironies of the 
early capitalist market economy was that men expected it to 
automatically lead to general welfare. By a complex 
interplay of economic and technological imperatives the 
community was slowly and steadily broken apart into mutually 
exclusive segments of action or spheres of operation. 
When labour became a mechanically regulated 
commodity, man lost a part of himself. This turns us to the 
major theme of Alienation; for as Karl Marx saw it, the 
worker; having lost control over both the conditions of his 
labour and the fruit of his labour, become alienated from 
17 himself. Marx described the existence of contemporary man 
as largely shaped by the r ise and dominant influence of 
commodity exchange. He considered the commodity to be the 
most elementary form of modem wealth and gave it a central 
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position in his analysis of the economic and social features 
of capitalism. Once commodity production has become the 
universal mode, all of man's economic activities and 
processes will centre around i t . Its main feature, exchange 
value, will reach out beyond the merely economic realm and 
1 fi penetrate the whole of human existence . Marx also asserts: 
"we are excluded from true property because our property 
19 
excludes the other man" . The Idea of Aliaiation, however, 
Marx had borrowed from Hegel, who 'conceived' it chiefly in 
metaphysical terms and who described it as a general human 
condition. Hegel wrote of "Spirit" as "at war with itself"; 
in consequence, it "has to overcome itself as i ts (own) most 
formidable obstacle. That development which in the sphere of 
Nature is a peaceful growth, is (for the) spir i t , a severe, 
a might conflict with itself. What spiri t really strives for 
is the realization of i ts Ideal being; but in doing so, it 
hides that goal from i ts own vision, and is proud and 
well-satisfied in this alienation" For Hegel, therefore, 
man's own intellectual creations become independait of their 
creator and hence alien to him. Human achievement is a 
dialectical process in which man can advance to higher forms 
only by mastering himself and the cultural forces that he 
creates. Therefore, the history of man is a history of his 
alienation or frustration. 
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While Hegal saw alienation as a metaphysical 
problem, Marx gave it a sociological frame of reference. In 
his essay of 1844 he wrote that under the system of private 
property the worker was alienated from the product of his 
labour and also from the means of production - both of which 
had become things "not belonging to him". The worker thus 
separated from his product is alienated from himself, sLnce 
his labour i s no longer his own but the prooerty of another. 
Finally he is alienated from other men, since his chief link 
with them now is the commodities they exchange or produce. 
This process alienates worker from nature. This results in 
self-estrangement, estrangement with his product and 
society. In order to find himself he has to destroy the 
capitalist society. 
The industrial revolution and its subsequent 
transformation of human labour into a commodity are among 
the major alienating forces in the capitalist world. To 
administer their complex technology and labour markets men 
developed elaborate social structures or bureaucracies 
which were no less impersonal in their effects than 
machines. Indeed, that was their aim; and they attempted 
further to "rationalize" the conduct of human affairs by 
subjecting it to rules, regulations and a hierarchy as 
described by Maxweber. Thus modem age has enormously tried to 
grope alien forces over men. Marx's analysis of the new 
51 
conditions of labour under capitalism was complemented half 
a century later by Weber's studies of bureaucracy. Weber 
thought that bureaucracy became particularly appropriate for 
capitalism because "the more bureaucracy 'depersonalizes' 
itself, the more completely it succeeds in achieving the 
exclusion of love, hatred, and very purely personal, 
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especially irrat ional and incalulable feeling from the 
execution of official tasks . In the place of the old-type 
ruler who is moved by sympathy, favour, grace and gratitude, 
modem culture requires for its sustaining external 
apparatus the emotionally detached, and hence rigorously 
'professional' expert" 
How industrial and bureaucratic machines aliwiate 
men can be seen clearly in modem conditions of work. 
Increasing division of labour, greater mechanization, the 
growth of giant industrial and financial ai terprises - these 
are the agents of our economic power and also of individual 
powerlessness. 
In a recent survey of industrial worker's attitudes 
Robert Dubin shows that for most of them work is not a 
central life interest . Dubin says, "Not only is the 
workplace relat ively unimportant as a place of preferred 
primary human relationship, but it cannot even evoke 
significant sentiments and emotions in its occupants". Most 
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workers are not happy in their jobs, that they feel traped 
and degraded by their working conditions, that they have 
powerful desire to escape from the factory, their works and 
that what drives them on is the incessant demands of our 
consumption economy. In view of the same far from escaping, 
growing numbers of industrial workers and their families are 
forced to take on additional jobs in order to keep us with 
the rising cost of living. 
Consequently there has been a serious fall in 
morale. It is a measure of the boring conditions of work. A 
cruel work situation is bound *^o evoke anger or rage, 
however, repressed. But even under "Ideal" conditions of 
bureaucratic order - where there are neither great creative 
incentives nor disruptive tensions - the result is an 
isolated, remote world of conformists, that is what Mills 
calls the "cheerful robberts" . 
The alienating influences of industrialism extend 
far beyond the individual worker; they alienate his family 
and his community with equal intensity and force. As the old 
crafts declined, and labour became increasingly divided and 
specialized, the economic and social base of the large 
family was destroyed. Lost were customs and skills that had 
been passed on from one generation to another. Gone were the 
close bonds between young and old, and especially the 
respect that youth had previously given to age. Into the new 
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industrial cities poured millions who nad been cut off from 
their traditional family roots. 
With changes in family function, especially the 
decline of large kinship group as an operating unit, have come 
significant changes in structure. Work is now increasingly 
separated from family life and Paraits disappear 
during the day, leaving children to grow up chiefly 
with servants or in boardings. They have no time 
to spend with their children. Most affected by the 
breakdown of the extended family, however are the aged. 
Overwhelming majority of citizens oppose the idea of 
having older persons live with their children. As these 
trends continue - the prolongation of life, early 
retirement, breakdown of the extended family - the aged 
become outcasts in a society like ours that places such emphasis 
on youth and energies. The elderly citizens are being 
increasingly shifted to separate housing colonies where 
they nurse their painful l ives by recourse to 
nostalgic remeraber§nces of their youth. In their twilight 
world there is only fleeting contact with the community. 
The r i se of 'nuclear family' ( the small core unit of 
parents and kids) is directly and intimately linked to these 
distinguishing or characterizing features of our industrial 
age, inspired and brought about by ever-increasing 
technological sophistication. 
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In the beginning we said that men today are 
estranged from others as well as from themselves. But 
"others" means not only the social communities in which 
they l ive; it also refers to the natural and supernatural 
worlds beyond. When we speak of man's alienation from 
nature, we do not mean nature in metaphysical sense -
although fairly serious metaphysical problems are 
involved; all we mean i s that men and women today are not 
as close to land, a i r , water wind and mountains as their 
ancestors were. That is how I express this feeling : 
The night kept descending 
I stared at the falling s tars , 
the s i lver streams 
flowed down the mountains 
fading in darkness, 
the constellation of s ta rs 
adorned the world and dissolved, 
and the moon bowed down 
to kiss the cold forehead 
the horizon darkened even deeper, 
I kept lying for long 
without a breath, a notion, 
and memory kept enveloping my being 
21 
with the dead leaves of fallen flowers. 
Isolation from nature is not just a -natter of 
living in cities even more importantly it involves a 
momentous change in man's outlook on the world. Men do 
not simply coexist with nature, they search for meaning in 
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i t . For this they depend on myth and religion. All 
religious beliefs known to man help create and sustain 
bonds between him and the external world of other men and 
of nature. But if faith weakens or is destroyed in the 
onslought of science and secularisation, man is truly 
alone. As Joseph Cambell wri tes , "The problem of mankind 
today is the opposite to that of men in the 
comparatively stable period of those great co-ordinating 
mythologies which now are known as l ies . Thai all meaning 
was in the group, in the great anonymous forms, none in 
the self-expressive individual; today no meaning is in 
the group - none in the world : all is in the individual. 
But one does not know toward that one moves. One does 
not know by what one is p r o p e l l e d . . . . Not the animal world, 
not the plant world, but man himself is now the crucial 
mystery. Man is that alien presence with whom the forces 
of egoism must come to terms, through whom the ego is to 
be crucified and resurrected and in whose image society is 
•-*'22 to be reformed. 
So we have a view of man divorced from nature, 
bereft of his religion, isolated in his community and 
chained to monotonous work. It is appropriate at this point 
to consider our Mass Society, its culture, and i ts 
pol i t ics . The mass society resulted from the rapid 
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increase in the size of the electorate. Extension of 
suffrage to the working class who had fought for it, led 
in turn to the r i se of mass political parties and also to 
new techniques of communication : mass circulation newspapers, 
films, radio and television etc . 
The results of these developments are well known. 
In polit ics, the number of people involved tend to engulf 
the individual, whether he dissents from majority opinion 
and taste, or whether he merely conforms helplessly with 
the overwhelming majority. 
What is alienating in mass society is not merely 
the corruption of a r t , or the power of the multitudes - a 
power often exaggerated but more importantly, the 
atomization of individuals who make up the mass. Mass 
society weakens or destroys traditional human groupings, 
thus leaving the individual at the mercy of impersonal 
"communication", such as newspaper, radio and internet In 
addition this process of communication itself, presumably a two-
way system, tends to become a one-way street, with individuals 
more on the receiving or taking end than on the giving 
end. How does one talk back to a TV screen ? As a result, 
the formation of opinion is facilitated for those who 
control the channels of communication. Whether they be 
propagandists or the advertising industry in our own 
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society; the stage is set for manipulation of tastes and 
opinions as obstacles to mass persuasion are removed. A 
polluted mass is alienated to the extent that it is 
powerless to withstand these pressures. So it is not 
masses but a powerful eli te which monopolizes the means of 
communications, thereby weakening primary human relations and 
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creating obedient multitudes. 
Another major form of alienation reflected at one 
extreme is the revolts of a r t i s t s and intellectuals against 
what they consider the uncongenial and materialistic 
standards of bourgeois society. Personifying this revolt 
in their ar t , as well as in the i r l ives, are writers like 
Baudelaire - ein "internal emigrant" who longed to escape 
"any where out of this world"; Rimband who did escape and 
whose self-imposed exile became a model for many artistic 
rebels following him; Dostovesky - who regarded the 
freedom of the atheistic individual, his loneliness and 
isolation as the greatest of evi ls and in whose works the twin 
themes of the atomization of society and self-alienation 
receive their supreme expression. We are dealing 
with more than mere disenchantment. Thus says 
Charless Peguy : "The modem world debases. It debases the 
s tate; it debases man. It debases love; it debases woman. 
It debases the race; it debases the chi ld . It debases the 
nation; it debases the family. It e v e n . . . . has succeeeded in 
debasing what is perhaps most difficult in the worlc to 
debase - because that is something which has in itself, as 
in i t s texture, a particular kind of dignity, like a singular 
24 incapacity for degradation - it debases death. 
Man's alienation has been described with methodic 
and terrifying precision by Kafka, who wrote of himself; 
"I am separated from all things by a hallow space, and I 
25 do not even reach to i t s boundaries". The main 
characters in his novels. The Trail and The Castle are 
completely depersonalized and reduced to mere masks. This 
loss of identity leads to a state of radical anonynity, 
which the author symbolizes by not using a name but merely 
a le t ter of the alphabet to refer to them. 
American novelists also have described man's fate 
in terms of alienation and homelessness. Thomas Wholfe, who 
devotes much of his work to recording the painful 
experience of the uprooted man, the nostalgic exile and 
wanderer, sums it up in the symbolic words of Engene 
Gant, the central figure of "The Return of the Prodigal"; 
"What did you came home for ? . . . . you know now that you 
can ' t go home again". 
Arthur Miller 's Death of a Salesman portrayes 
l ives of many individuals. It shows Willv Loman - the 
"other - directed man" personified - striving all his life 
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to be popular and " l iked" but remaining absolutely lonesome and 
i r r e l e v e n t , forever dreaming tha t "personal i ty always wins the 
day" but in r e a l i t y de s t i ned , as h i s wife fears , "to fall 
into h i s g rave l i k e an old dog" motto i s : s ta r t big and 
you will end b i g . He a d v i s e s h is son : "Get r ight 
down the field under t h e b a l l , and when you h i t , hi t low 
and hi t h a r d " . He does not r e a l i z e that he himself is 
k icked around and tha t h i s whole ex is tence i s summed up in the 
world with which one of t h e women in the play descr ibes 
h e r l i fe "a foot b a l l " . 
The a l ienat ion i s not an unknown phenomenon to the 
Asian phychy a l s o , e spec i a l l y to famous Urdu poet Ghalib 
w h o ' s f i rs t oeot ic col lect ion pub l i shed during the Indian mutiny 
b e a r s a famous pe r s i an couplet : 
BEAWARED CAR EINJA BUWAD SUKHAN DANE 
GHAREEBE SHAHR SUKHAN HAE GUFTANI DARAD 
There i s a person who i s in search of a close 
friend to whom he can d i s c l o s e a l l t he ins ights of h is hea r t . 
The same echo we can find in the famous d i sc ip le of Ghalib, 
Altaf Hussain who has sa id in h i s couplet that he is in 
s e a r c h of a person who can understand his language and 
emotion : 
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KOYEE MEHRAM NAHIN MILTA JAH-XN MEN 
MUJHE KEHNA HAI KUCH APNI ZU3AN MEN 
Even Iqbal has exolored the he lp lessness of human self: 
TERAIf AZAD BANDON KI NA YE DUNIYA NA WO DUNIYA 
YAHAN MARNAY KI PABANDI WAHAN JEENAY KI PABANDI 
Alienation exp re s sed by Art i s t s is the most 
sensa t iona l . The w r i t e r s whom we quoted, reflect a growing 
contemporary concern about man ' s Isolation and Alienation 
but t h i s does not mean tha t they visualize t h i s 
estrangement in the same way as the exis tent ia l is ts do . 
Unlike those fol lowers of Heidegger and Sartre who look 
man ' s al ienat ion and homelessness as his eternal fate, many 
of those who turn to the w r i t e r s we have mentioned 
a t t r i b u t e the al ienat ion to h i s to r i ca l even t s . 
Such an explanat ion, no doubt right in emphasizing the 
h i s t o r i c a l a spec t s of man 's a l iena t ion , a t t r ibutes the r i s e of 
a l ienat ion to a few isola ted and almost fortuitous occurraices 
which have broken in upon the l i v e s of the present generation -
so to speak - from t h e ou t s ide . However, such a p r e c i s e is of 
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dubious merit because it tends unduly to limit the scope of 
inquiry. It leads us to ignore that alienation is manifest in all 
realms of modem life, that i ts existence is not just the result 
of certain accidents of recent history but exemplifies one of 
the basic trends of our age. To conclude I would like to 
mention one of my poems : 
My bed is a wilderness 
of sleeplessness, 
I break into peices 
licking dust, 
I wear a white layer 
of Plaster of Paris 
every night 
on my being, 
and when the morning a r r ives 
I find a line drawn 
on my bed, 
and the continuity of that line 
remains intact 
even when divided 
28 into a thousand b i t s . 
CHAPTER III 
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THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION 
The feeling of alienation in the form of unfulfilment of 
a sense or lack is ever present in the being of man. It is 
thus not a feeling peculiar to our age; only it has now 
assumed an acute form. Alienation is native to our very 
nature. Yet it cannot be denied that the factors responsible 
for alienation or creating an alienating atmosphere are found 
to be more powerful in our age or in some social, cultural 
economic conditions rather than in o thers . In our day to day 
life we feel more and more concerned about the increasing 
magnitude of this problem. The growing prevalence of 
alienation is due to various factors. The fast life style, 
the complex and competitive socio-economic structure, the 
political atmosphere of confrontation and disobedience, 
automatization and increasing dehumanization of the uses of 
science and technology - each of these factors, besides many 
others , has contributed to a growing sence of alienation in 
the world today. Alienation pertains not only to our feelings 
but to the whole of our being, to i t s very aspect. Alienation 
has been a persistent problem for man since the begining of 
the civilization. But it has assumed importance in philosophy 
and l i terature in the society with the develooment of 
Industry and technology on a mass scale . Earlier Philosoohers, 
particularly greeks, were more concerned with the cosmos and 
Ideas. Man was also treated as the manifestation of Rationality 
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(Aristotle). Except Socrates no other Western thinker seeiis to 
be interested in the Individual man of flesn and bones, his 
sufferings, his choice of destiny, his growth and his death. 
Of course greek plays and peotry did not ignore man as an 
aspiring and suffering individual l ike promethius. Philosophy 
on the whole remained interested in generalizations and 
universal ideas and principles. Mystics though their approach 
apparently God-centric, dealt with individual man, for it was 
he whose spiri tual journey was their main concern. In the 
East Budhism is the only philosophy that is concerned with 
human suffering. Budha was mainly interested in finding out a 
way out from suffering. Likewise in Sufi tradition we find 
interest in individual man. 
The English concept 'alienation' goes back to the 
Latin concepts 'alienation' (alienare) and 'abalinatio' 
(abalienare). These concepts employed by senecar and 
especially cicero, essentially designated the sale of a 
commodity; the cessation transfer, or sale of rights and 
property. The main application of the concepts 'alienatio' and 
'abalienatio' was therefore in the area of Roman civil and 
agrarian law (mitteis, 1908, p 145; Sturm,. 1957). Furthermore, 
'alienation' in the sense of alienatio mentails' has a medical -
psychiatric connotation which has been retained in the 
1 
voctlbulary of the discipline. 
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The term 'alienation' historically had three basic 
senses, all of which derive from the root concept of the 
'a l ien ' as the different, the foreign. In one sense it refers 
to the kind of economic transfer. In another it refers to a 
condition of separation or estrangement from someone or 
something other than oneself, with which one once was or 
ideally should be united. And in a third, it refers to a 
state of mental derangement or disorder. 
When alienation in the sense of transfer occurs, one 
gives up and no longer has ownership of and control over 
something which once belonged to one. When alienation in the 
sense of separation occurs one is unable to identify with 
someone or something with which one might under other 
circumstances be at one. And when alienation in the sense of 
derangement obtains, one is not oneself and he might be said 
to be a stranger to oneself. 
In our common day to day life the term 'alienation' 
has been variously used and possesses varied meanings in 
religion, in sociology, in science, in psychology or in 
philosophy. But all of these different usages of such an 
interdisciplinary concept seem to have a common core which 
is derived from its etymology. The word in general refers 
to the process of separation or estrangement of somebody or 
something from something else (to which it ought to be 
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essentially connected). 
Melvin Seeman, in his art icle 'on the Meaning of 
Alienation', offers an elaborate conceptual analysis of its 
diverse meanings. Seman enumerates the following five meanings 
of the term 'alienation' : 
(a) Powerlessness: The expectancy or probability held by the 
individual that his own behaviour cannot determine the 
occurence of the outcomes or reinforcements he seeks. 
(b) Meaninglessness: A low expectancy that satisfactory 
predictions about the future outcomes of behaviours can be 
made. 
(c) Normlessness: A high expectancy that socially unapproved 
behaviours are required to achieve given goals. 
(d) Isolation: Assigning low reward value to goals or beliefs 
that are typically highly valued in the given society. 
(e) Self-estragement: The degree of dependence of the given 
behaviour upon anticipated future rewards, i . e . ; upon 
rewards that lie outside the activity itself." 
The concept of alienation was first philosophicallv 
elaborated by Hegel. He was the first Western philosopher 
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who discussed the problem of "estrangement" of God from his 
creation and in this context he also dealt with the problem 
of mans' Alienation. As against Hegels idealistic-rationalistic 
approach to this problem, Kierkegaard, his contemporary, 
approached to this issue from human view-point and thus laid 
down foundation of existentialist philosophy of man, which 
found exponents in the twentieth century as Jasper 's, 
Heidegger, Sartre, Marx and Camus. Earlier than modem 
existentialists Karl Marx, paid attention as to how man is 
alienated from nature, God, society and himself in captialist 
industrial society. The 20th century "philosophy of man" in a 
highly mechanical culture dominated by tectinocracy and 
buraucracy, found man reduced to the status of a negligible 
part of a gignatic machinary that resulted in a continuing 
process of dehumanization, a form and course of individuals 
Alienation at various levels . 
Some writers have maintained that the christian 
doctrine of original Sin and redemption can be regarded as a 
first version of Hegel's doctrine of alienation and dealienation. 
According to others , the concept of Alienation found its first 
expression in Western thought in the old Testraent concept of 
idolatry. Still others have maintained that the source for 
Hegel's view of nature as a self alienated form of absolute 
mind can be found in Plato 's view of natural world as 
imperfect picture of the sublime world of Ideas. Among 
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others , the positive meaning of alienation is also taken uo by 
plotinus (205-70). Furthermore, we find positive connotations 
with Augustine (325-430) and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), who 
2 both in turn have had an influence on Hegel and Fichte. 
Plotinus dealt with the task of soul : not to fall 
prey to the body, rather to keep close to itself, so to speak, 
in a suspended state . At the same time, plotinus reflected 
upon the necessity, that the soul (the ' l igh t ' ) needs the body 
in order to perceive anything at a l l . Without a body, the 
soul would remain completely in pneuma, in the spiritual realm, 
and therefore would not be able to go through the other, the 
3 
body in order to return to the l ight . 
For Thomas Aquiras (1225-1274) 'alienatio' is always 
a preparatory stage for the rea l , the experience of God. He 
too connects ecstasy with alienation. In 'The Summa 
Theologica' he essentially deals with alienation as 'alienation a 
4 
sens ibus ' . 'Alienatio a sensibus' can mean, for example, that 
the 'Spir i t ' of the prophet is illuminated by the light. 
Meister Eckhart attempts to transcend the limitation in 
Thomas's concept of alienation - a limitation that asserts the 
val idi ty of only the supernatural emotion devoid of any 
corpon a l i ty . The meaning of alienation is widened .Only God is 
without 'anything a l ien ' ; everything that has come into being, 
that has been created, is alien by contrast. The soul in order 
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to redeam an unalienated status, has to liberate itself from the 
creature - l ike body and herewith from life, has to carry 
itself off to 'despir i tual ize ' only because the soul withdrawn 
itself from the life (usually viewed as rational) in which it 
has sunk before, does this abolition of alienation become 
possible. We can also say that alienation, for Meister Eckhart 
5 
is the precondition of true l ife. 
Although we cannot call 'alienation' a new term, it 
has come into prominance recently. Hegel and Marx make 
extensive use of the concept. Marx traces the sources of 
alienation to the workers lack of spiritual development and 
thus it is a necessary phase to all progress. Existentialism 
tends to see estrangement as arising from a lack of self-
acceptance of the failure to develop an independent self. 
Freedom almost necessitates alienation, because one who is free 
does not have to be anything. Thus, one is alienated from 
himself because the requisite decisions to crystalise the self 
have not yet been made. If freedom remains, it follows that 
alienation will be a constant human experience as long as 
choice las ts . Thus we find that sources of alienation are 
many. Furthermore, alienation is a by-product of an increasing 
sense of freedom and may have to be tolerated if the 
uncertavtfcies of the freedom are valued. 
As long as multiple accounts of the source and nature 
of alienation are given, it cannot be finally overcome. Thus the 
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basis of alienation lies in the existence of plurality of 
philosophies which never allow man to view himself under one 
pattern only. As long as intellectual freedom remains alienation 
and phi losopher 's feeling of estrangement will oersist. Infact 
it is alienation that forms the basic philosophical attitude of 
questioning. 
Kierkegaard finds in ' the Pathos of distance' the 
source of the poetic spir i t that produces verbal creation. of 
course, he is the one in the modem age who has stressed the 
essential 'aloneness' of men in all crucial and decesive phases 
of choice. To be alienated may be to be creative, although 
most existentialists are disillusioned romanties. They recognise 
that such total aloneness and freedom is hard to bear and is 
also the source of self destruction, as often as it leads to 
creat ive effort. Those who simply accept prevailing values and 
themselves as they are do not experience alienation, but 
neigher do they leam the origin of philosophic attitude of 
cr i t ic ism. 
Hegel believed that philosophy could itself provide a 
feeling of triumph over alienation. Kierkegaard essentially denies 
th is by reversing the role of the philosopher. The philosopher 
is one who by nature must be immersed in the ordinary world 
with i t s inevitable alienations. Hegel could escape by idealised 
thought; Kierkegaard could not. If all of us as souls are 
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divided, we all experience alienation to the extent that we 
do not discover a final unity. If as selves the world around 
stays alien to us in the sense of being 'other ' to live the 
world among men is never to escape a feeling of alienation. 
Estrangement from ones fellowmen and from society often 
coincides with a period of great productivity. 
The predicament of contemporary man is best 
predicted not only in the absurd literatures of the Anglo-
American and European languages but also in the languages of 
developing world. With the eradication of traditional values 
and facing the world without a God and where their can be 
no appeal to supernatural forces and where the traditional 
religious beliefs have lost their relevence and efficacy, 
man finds himself hanging betweai earth and heaven. His 
feet cannot reach the earth and his hands are unable to get 
hold of skies . In the absaice of Religious beliefs and 
prospects of another world after this life, man has to squarly 
face the fact of his death and annihilation. 
Since for the most of the contemporary men, there is 
no God. Man is the author of his destiny and he is the only 
source of his values. He is free to choose and as Dostovesky 
has said, "if there i s no God everything is allowed". This 
implies that man is solely responsible for his condition in this 
l i fe. Man creates his own society. Man creates his own 
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world. Consequently it is only man who is responsible for his 
actions. In this situation when man is deprived of the 
traditional supports of Religion and other sorts of supernatural 
systems, and when he is confronted with a hostile environment 
in a society where there is no social justice and above all 
when man has this realization that some day he has to die and 
that will be the end of his world. He not only feels despair 
and anguish but often times feels not only alienated from the 
society and the people around him but also from himself. 
Today, people have acquired a certain amount of main 
types of exis t^ ice , such as that of wage-earner; the salaried 
employee, the peasent, the handicrafts man, the enterpreneur, 
the civil servant . But the general fellowship of our human 
situation has been rendered even more dubious than before, in 
as much as , though the old t ies of cast have been lowered, a 
new restr ict ion of the individual to some prescribed status in 
the sociological machinary has become manifest. What is today 
common to us a l l , is not our humanity as a universal and all 
prevading spi r i t of fellowship, but the cosmopolitanism of 
catchwards in conjunction with the spread of world-wide means 
of communication. The general sociological situation is not the 
decisive factor in our destines, being rather that which 
threatens us with annihilation. The decesive factor is the 
developing possibi l i ty of a selfhood. This selfhood does not 
yet ex is t . 
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We are not much aware of the pre-historical nan 
although contemporary and Anthropological Research has been 
able to bring out massive Researches on the life conditions of 
ancient man who was mostly confined to his tribe culture and 
moores. He mostly substained by my— thical views and 
engagements. However subsequently powerful religious traditions 
emerged and man at different points of history and geograohy 
lived by articulate world views and value systems. The 
historical Religion such as Hinduism, Judiasm, Christanity, 
Islam etc. provided elaborate doctrinal frame works wherein 
ontological, cosmological and axiological questions pertaining to 
human existence were sought to be answered. For the last 
three thousand years man has been living within the parameters 
of these frame works. His existential questions, his 
sociopolitical ideas and his moral do ' s and donol's were 
responded by these world views. However with onset of 
modernization chiefly heralded by experimental science and 
technology, the grip of historical religion on human society 
has been loosened. Science, although presumbly a value free 
enterprlze and methodical integration of universe, as a matter of 
fact impinges upon our values^ beliefs and cultural outlooks and 
consequently a new civilisation pattern emerges with i ts own 
normative structure and interests and pr ior i t ies . 
Therefore contemporary man is caught between his 
tradit ion. Religion, moorings and modem scientific imperatives. 
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The tradition. Religion and modern science simultaniousiv puils 
modern mind and compel for his loyalties. Religion 
traditionally provided him a set of definitions and norms 
whereby man could atune himself to the vast space-Time 
continium called universe. Science leads technological 
development but It simultaniously robes of his spiritual moorings. 
Thus modem man is on the horns of any self Analysis. This 
has lead to wide spread normlessness and consequently modem 
man is Alienated from himself, from universe and from God. 
The construction of mental situation of the present 
will continue with growing awareness of the limits of the 
knowledge, on the one hand and of the risks of undue 
absoluteness, on the other, there will be a tendency to rest 
content with particular perspectives as representations of the 
situation. In their particulari ty they will be valid but they 
will have no absolute val id i ty . 
In order to trace out the causes of Alienation, the 
roots of powerlessness and meaninglessness are to be sought. 
To discover, when Alienation occurs is to discover what forces 
generate powerlessness. 
The roots of powerlessness and meaninglessness lie in 
the relationships between Social systems and Individuals. 
74 
Relationships between Social systems and individuals are 
determined in two ways: 
1. The degree Social systems are endowed with legitimacy and 
2. the degree system integration is indeterminate. The first 
dimension is instrumental. It indicates the extent Social 
systems allow individuals to persue goals of their own 
choice. The second dimension is expressive. It shows the 
extent Social systems permit expression of Individual 
identi ty. These two dimensions are explored by Jan Hajda 
and Robert Travis in the following way: 
Ligitimacy, illegitimate control and quasi-legitiraacy. 
Legitimacy is a quality of Social systems, stemming 
from those sets of embraced principles which embody the 
common good. These principles can be rationalized into law or 
articulated by a leader. 
Legitimacy has two primary functions: to formalize 
authority by conferring the right to command and to lend the 
system enduring meaning. The right to issue commainds may be 
granted to one person, a select few or almost everyone. As 
long as legitimized principles endure, authority exists 
unquestioned. This is important since authority alleviates fear 
among individuals. It frees rulers from fearing their own 
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subjects, while liberating subjects from fearing their own 
ru le rs . 
Legitimacy, moreover, endows Social systems with 
meaning. This endowed meaning becomes an incontrovertible 
rea l i ty , which serves as a reference point and confirms for 
individuals that what they do is r ight . 
Thus Legitimacy engenders acceptance of Social 
Systems. This is part icularly true as successive generations 
enter these systems, taking legitimacy for granted. Consequently 
individual-system relations appear spontaneous and voluntary. 
Individuals come to regard system-goals as their own and 
believe they can realize their objectives within its framework. 
But legitimacy represents only the mid-point on one 
continum, the power extremes being illegitimacy and 
quasilegitimacy. For legitimacy can be undermined, changing 
into illegitimacy, by corruption, arbltariness or exploitation. 
Legitimacy can also be turned into quasilegitimacy by 
ineptitude, forgetfulness, and resistance to over conflict. while 
illegitimacy embodies deliberate disregard of sanctions, quasi-
legitimacy entails irresolute use of sanctions. Both represent 
c r i s i s of legitimacy. 
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Example of illegitimate control abound: dictatorships, 
military cliques or desports; governments, political parties, 
business enterpr ises , labour unions, or associations all riven by 
corruption and scandal; economic systems or corporations that 
maximize profits by keeping wages low; legel or defecto 
systems of segregation that restr ict opportunities for minorities; 
and androcentric institutions that regard women as unequals. 
Those subjects to illegitimate control have one thing 
in common i . e . they perceive a profund discrepancy between the 
choices they would like to make and the choice social systems 
allow them. They realize they are being used, deceived, 
manipulated, oppressed or persecuted; that they are mere 
objects of other people 's actions. The result in instrumental 
powerlessness, the recognition of a relative inability to 
influence or control ones social destiny, accompanied by 
perception that th is powerlessness is wrong and unjust. 
On the other hand, quasilegitimacy is a repeatedly 
renewed provisional state which seeks to forestall anarchy and 
chaos. It keeps social systems going despite their absurdity. 
It is based on defacto conditions created by fortuitous 
circumstances and the present lack of meaninghful alternatives. 
Quasi-legitimacy often arr ises when non-political 
experts gain control of political reins; when political parties 
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Quasi-legitimacy often arises when non-Dolitical 
experts gain control of political reins; when political parties 
offer roughly the same kind of programs and condidates; when 
bureaucracies ensnare their clients in red tape; when 
congregations becomes mainly community centres or social 
outlets; or when marriages are merely for convenience. 
Rulers claim opportunities are limitless, while 
individuals realize the situational myths of such claims. 
Instrumental meaninglessness resul t s , as individuals are forced 
to choose among a set of alternatives between which there are 
no real differences. When choices became empty, choice 
becomes meaningless. Following figure presents this argument 
graphically. 
Illegitimate 
Control 
PowerlesSness 
Legitimacy 
No alienation 
Quasi-legitimacy 
Meaninglessness 
of choices 
Near the mid-point individuals experience little or no 
alienation, since their choices are in harmony with those 
offered by legitimized social o rde r s . Departure from the mid-
point brings about a gradual, then rapid intensity of alienation. 
When individuals prefer and what social systems allow becomes 
78 
inverted. At the polar extremes, Alienation becomes 
unbearable. But halfway between the mid-point and the poles 
alienation moderates, representing the most likely occurrences. 
Such alienation embodies the melding of either illegitimacy or 
quasi-legitimacy with legitimacy itself. Thus, powerlessness 
ar^d-ses among working-class youths who contend the class 
system blocks them from attaining those system goals they want 
to reach; among employees locked in dead-end jobs within 
organizations they s t i l l respect; or among people of a 
government they could not support, but whose constitution 
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they s t i l l believed in. 
CHAPTER IV 
BXISTENTIAIJST CONCEPT OF ALIENATION 
Existential ism has been a reaction in favour of 
individualism, Subjectivity introspection and feeling. It is a 
Philosophy not of things but of human situation. Existentialists' 
major thesis is the metaphysical pronouncement that "Existence 
is prior to essence", while in the established tradition 
"essence is prior to existence". What this means for 
existential ists i s that human nature is determined by the course 
of life ra ther than life by human nature. 
Alienation is a part of human nature. Whatever man 
does, individually or collectively, bears the imprint of 
alienation. For the existentialist , alienation is understood 
chiefly in inward terms. It is the existent 's alienation from 
his own deepest being. He is not himself but simply a thing 
of no importance in the mass existence of the crowd. In Marx 
system alienation is called that condition of man where his own 
act becomes to him an alien power, standing over and against 
him, instead of being ruled by him. Initially Marx was deeply 
impressed by Feurbach's analysis of Religious alienation. 
However he immediately realized that the religious form of 
alienation was only one-sided and part ial . It is only one among 
many other aspects of human alienation. Marx discovered that 
the basic form of alienation was economic, rooted in the 
capitalist mode of production. When human labour becomes and 
is treated as , a marketable commodity, man becomes 
dehumanized. A separation grows between man-as-man and man-
as-labour. 
Marx led to beleive that God is a creation of man's 
speculative mind. Thus the God-man relationship is completely 
reversed. This is a transition from spiritual theology to 
natural theology. Marx observes : 
Man makes religion; religion does not make man. 
Religion is indeed man's self-consciousness and self-awareness 
so long as he has not found himself or lost himself again. But 
man is not an abstract being, squatting outside the world. Man 
is the human world, the state, the society. The state, the 
society produce religion which is the consciousness of an 
inverted world because it is an inverted world. 
Marx does not consider religion to be the only seat 
of alienation. It is present also in Society and State. 
Alienation pervades all spheres of human life. It is not 
peculiar to the realms of religion and politics only. Marx 
traces i t s roots in the capitalist economic system of the time. 
The Social system and political structure reflect alienation. 
Hegel's tendency to understand alienation as the sp i r i t ' s 
estrangement from itself had a subjectivist overtone, alienation 
was depicted as an affair confined within the realm of mind. 
In contrast Marx discovered that alienation of mind was due to 
the productive relations into which human beings as classes 
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were thrown. Labour is the key concept in Marxian 
interpretation of alienation. It is the essence of human nature. 
It is his ' l i f e -ac t iv i ty ' . Marx uses a term ' praxis'-labour 
related to an objective situation and directed to the realization 
of particular goal. It is through praxis that man creates 
objects, changes and gives objects, transforms the world around 
him and in process transforms himself. In the capitalist 
Society the worker suffers different types of Alienation. 
The worker is related to the product of his labour 
as to an alien object. The object he produces does not belong 
to him, dominates him, and only serves in the long run to 
increase his poverty. Alienation appears not only in the result 
but also in the process of production and productive activity 
itself. The worker is not at home in his work which he views 
only as a meeins of satisfying other needs. It is an activity 
directed against himself, that is independent of him and does 
not belong to him. Thirdly alienated labour succeeds in 
alienating man from species . Species life, productive life, life 
producing life, turns into a mere means of sustaining the 
worker 's individual existence and man is alienated from man, 
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who thus loses his inorganic body. 
Hegel beleived that every form of objectification is 
alienation. Marx deviated from this Hegelian view. He felt 
that alienation was limited only to some specific forms of 
objectification where the object gets lost to the individual and 
takes an alien implication. It is this distinction between 
alienation and objectification that lead Marx to caoitalist mode 
of production. That in a capitalist society the labourer 
becomes alienated is due to the fact that ' h i s ' praxis turns out 
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to be impersonal, i . e . not really h i s . The labourer finds it 
impossible for him to identify himself with the product of his 
labour. He cannot own i t , it belongs to the controlling class. 
In the capitalist market the labourer is obliged to put his 
labour on sale as if it were a commodity. Thus it is not only 
his product which is alien to him, his own labour is also alien 
to him because it is marketed, bought and owned by capitalist. 
The Alienation of labour is that the work he 
performs is not personal to him, is not part of his nature, 
therefore he does not fulfil himself in work but actually denies 
himself. He feels miserable rather than content. Only while 
not working can the worker be himself while at work he 
experiences himself as stranger. His labour is not voluntary 
but forced labour. It satisfies no spontaneous creative urge, 
but is only a means for the satisfaction of wants which have 
nothing to do with work. Its alien character is revealed by 
the fact that when no physical or other compulsion exists, work 
is avoided. The alienated character of worker is shown by the 
fact that at work he belongs not to himself but to another. 
Just as religion the spontaneous activity of human imagination, 
of the huaan brain and heart , is seen as the alien activity of 
gods or devi ls , so the workers labour is no more his own 
spontaneous act ivi ty, but is something impersonal, inhuman and 
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belonging to another. Through his work the labourer loses his 
identi ty. 
As a result worker feels freely active only in his 
animal functions - eating drinking procreating while in his 
human and social functions he is reduced to an animal. 
Certainly eating, drinking and procreating are also human 
functions but abstractly considered, apart from all other human 
activit ies and regarded as ultimate ends in themselves, they are 
merely animal functions. 
In Marxian analysis there is no inter-individual 
relationship in the capitalist society. There is lack of human 
intimacy. There is no subjectivity. The worth of man is 
determined not by his personal quali t ies . Marx highlights that 
the social network of human relations generated by the 
capitalist economy is bound to be marked by alienation. 
Alienation may be a property of human action. An action is 
called alienation by Marx if by and through it a person, or a 
group or an institution, or a society becomes or remains 
separated (1) from the products/results of its own activity; 
and/or (2) from the activity itself; and/or (3) from the nature 
in which it l ives; and/or (4) from other human beings. 
When a man is aware of his capacity to create some 
new possibilit ies and yet feels simultaneously excluded from 
actually creating them, he feels alienated from himself. Man's 
identity is his poss ibi l i t ies . When his incapacity affects that 
identity, alienation is the consequence. Self-alienation is the 
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very essence of alienation. Self alienation is used in two 
senses in Marx. It may mean the misappropriation of labour 
and i ts product. When man's personal and spiritual powers are 
controlled by others, his very self becomes alienated. His 
service is put to o ther ' s use. The term 'Self-alienation' is 
used by Marx also to determine man's departure from his truely 
essential nature. Distinct individuality lively society and 
cultivated sensibility are among the defining characteristics of a 
truely human being. But these characteristics are seriously 
affacted by the increasing impersonal capitalist system of 
production. Free market economy gradually dehumanizes man and 
reduces him to the position of a machine. Marx was deeply 
moved by this inhuman process and by the misery and sufferLng 
of the exploited labourer. 
The notion of alienation has been depicted in many 
ways in HEGEL's writings. It is a basic idea of Hegel's 
philosophy that whatever i s , is in the last analysis, Absolute 
Idea (Absolute Mind, Absolute Spiri t , or in popular language, 
God) and that Absolute Idea is neither a set of fixed things nor 
a sum of static properties but a dynamic self, engaged in a 
circular process of alienation and dealienation. Nature is only 
a self-alienated form of Absolute Mind, and man is the Absolute 
in the process of dealienation. The whole of human history is 
the constant growth of man's knowlede of the Absolute and, at 
the same time, the development of Self-knowledge of the 
Absolute who through finite mind becomes Self-aware and 
"returns" to himself from his self-alienation in nature. 
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However finite mind (man) also beccnes alienated. It is 
essential characteristic of man to produce things, to oDiectifv 
itself in physical things, to express itself in objects, to 
objectify itself physically, Socially and culturaly and every 
objectification is an instance of alienation. The produced 
objects become alien to the producer. 
Hegel's formulation of his basic issue is closely 
connected with his ontology and methodology. The Hegelian 
Absolute spir i t is undoubtedly the central notion of his 
metaphysics. But this reali ty is essentially dynamic and 
expresses itself through a dialectic process. The process is 
continously marked by alienation and dealienation. Its primary 
rythms are Self-posting, Self-negating and Self-uniting. The 
sp i r i t s Self-consciousness is realized dialectically. To start 
with, it is immediate but i t s inner dynamics introduces elements 
of differentiation in i t . This necessitates the objectification of 
the Spirits Self-consciousness. In i t s momentof Self-objectification 
the Spirit is alienated from i t s immediate character. Creative 
activity is bound to prove alienative in a sense. The Self-
estrangement of the Spirit is not the only form of alienation 
Hegel speaks of. Another form of it is in the seeming 
bifurcation of the Spirit in two different realms, human and 
natural. Man is undoubtedly a clear expression of consciousness. 
And the Sp i r i t ' s consciousness is present in nature as well. 
Both nature and man may be interpreted in two different ways, 
alienated from their common sustaining ground, Geist (Spirit) . 
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and also alienated from each other. If man is considered 
essential in his finitude, he seems to be alienated froTi, if not 
antithetical to , nature. But, viewed from another standpoint, a 
more comprehensive one, he is a part of nature, the la t ter ' s 
7 Self-consciousness. The materialist or the physicalist miaht 
think that nature has nothing to do with consciousness; but it is 
not consciousness of i ts consciousness. Nature and man have 
affinity, if not unity, between them. But Hegel concedes tnat 
at the surface level man's Self-posting nature entails denial or 
negation of his life makes him conscious of how much he ov.es 
and belongs to nature. This consciousness negates his 
essentially alienative consciousness. 
Hegel uses the notion of alienation in two quite 
different senses. This may be deduced from the two different 
expressions he uses in this context. 
(i) Enttausserung and (ii) Entfremdung. The former literally 
means detachment, implying turning outward in order to realize 
the true inner self; the l a t t e r ' s literal meaning is estrangement-
surrender of what man actually is in order to become what he 
potentially i s . Referring to these two usages of alienation 
Richard Schacht speaks of 'alienation 1' and 'alienation 2 ' . 
The former means separation or discordant relation such as 
might obtain between the individual and the Social substance, 
and the lat ter means ' a surrender or sacrifice of particularity 
and wilfulness, in connection with the overcoming of 'alienation!' 
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and the re-attainment of unity. From HegelianisTi it oecorr^es 
evident that the first stage of alienation 1 is infelicitous and 
unhappy. But the second stage of 'alienation 2' is highly 
commendable and fruitful. Thus having taken up the notion of 
alienation from Social philosophy Hegel transformed it into a 
metaphysical notion. He uses it to characterise the process of 
progressive and alternating Self-differentiation and Self-
identification of the Spirit , the main theme of his metaphysics. 
A classic analysis of the fundamental duality of 
human existence is provided by SOREN KIERKEGAARD. He 
relates it to the phenomenon of anxiety. What emerges in 
Kierkegaard's analysis is not yet alienation in the full sense 
but rather what makes alienation possible. 
Kierkegaard discribes the anxiety of existence in 
three ways: first , it is already inherent in the state of 
innocence. Already in dreaming innocence there is something 
l ike an instabil i ty, an uneasiness, a presentiment that disturbs 
the tranquility of b l i ss . "This is the profound secret of 
9 
innocency that at the same time it is anxiety. Secondly, 
anxiety is also linked to freedom. Again it is a kind of 
instabili ty prior to action. Kierkegaard describes anxiety as 
the dizziness or "veritgo" of Freedom. For freedom means 
possibil i ty and to stand is l ike standing on the edge of a 
precipice. One is standing on the firm or given, but to leave 
the given and to cast oneself into possibility is to let life 
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become a fluid. This stirring of possibility in primordial 
freedom is experienced as anxiety, the awareness of complexity, 
differentiation and possible alienation within the very depth of 
one's being. 
Third^ Kierkegaard associates anxiety also with the 
traditional philosophical doctrine that man is constituted of body 
and soul. This is taken to mean that in the very way he is 
constitued, man is subject to the tention of anxiety. The human 
task is to accomplish the synthesis of body and soul and this 
task is from the begening laden with anxiety. Anxiety is a 
peculiarly human phenomenon, related to the peculiar duality of 
the human condition. An animal knows no anxiety for its life is 
purely sensuous. But man in his "middle state", conjoining 
sense and intellect, body and soul, the given and the possible, 
l ives in the tension of anxiety. 
Kierkegaard while writing review of a novel, "The 
present age" protests against the levelling. 
"The levelling process", he writes is not the action of 
an individual but the work of reflection in the hands of an 
abstract power. It is therefore possible to calculate the law 
governing it in the same way that one calculates diagonal in a 
parallelogram of forces. The individual who levels down is 
himself engulfed in the process and so on, and while he seems 
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to know selfishly what he is doing one can only say of peoole 
"en masse" that they know not what they do; for just a 
collective enthusiasm produces a surplus which does not come 
from the individual, there is also a surplus in this case. A 
demon is called up over whom no individual has any power and 
though the very abstraction of leveling gives the individual a 
momentary, selfish kind of enjoyment he is at the same time 
signing the warrant for his own doom. Enthusiasm may end in 
disaster , but levelling is "eo ipso" the destruction of the 
individual. No age, and therefore not the present age, can 
bring the scepticism of that process to a stop, for as soon as 
it t r ies to stop i t , the law of levelling process is again called 
into action. 
It can therefore only be stopped by the individual 
attaining in his loneliness the courage and dauntlessness of a 
12 
religious man answerable to God. 
Levelling destroys the singularity and qualitative 
difference of the self, and therefore the order of value and of 
s tatus. A sort of external alienation arises; the individual 
disappears in the mass. 
This implies a new interpretation of alienation. The 
disappearance of the self in the mass is external alienation. 
Kierkegaard would go a certain way with Hegel. He would agree 
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that alienation is a Self-estrangement of the mind, not however, 
of the abstract or universal but of the individual mind or of 
the Self. He would further admit that man's intellectual culture 
represents a realm of estrangement. That is man has lost his 
Self, has ceased to be a man, has suffered dehumanization. 
Having become "objective", he fails to be a subject. He has 
become an abstract phantom and has lost his concrete life. He 
has ceased to exist and is in fact, non-existent. He is no 
longer a Christian, though externally he may be a member of a 
Church. 
Alienation to Kierkegaard is a process going on in 
one's own self, not an external but an internal relation, based 
on ones own attitude to oneself. That is perhaps why 
Kierkegaard becomes the Psychologist or rather the 
Psychopathologist of Self-estrangement. He heralds the age of 
anxiety by describing the state of Alienation as anxiety. 
Anxiety refers to something indefinite. It is uncanny 
apprehension of some impending evil , of something not presKit 
but to come, of something not within us, but of an alien power. 
Kierkegaard describes it as a sympathetic antipathy and an 
antipathetic sympathy, as a desire for what one d r e a d s . . . . an 
alien power, which c a p t i v a t e s . . . . with a sweet apprehension". 
13 He compares it to a dizziness "in which freedom succumbs". 
In his "The sickness unto Death" Kierkegaard goes one 
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step further in his analysis of Alienation. Here Anxiety is 
transformed into despair and despair is the sickness unto deatn. 
It implies an important stage in the spiritual history of modem 
man, where modem doubt and scepticism turns inward focuses on 
one's own self and therefore leads to despair. Despair, says 
Kierkegaard, is the misproportion in the relation of the self to 
self, or every disturbance in the process of becoming a self, a 
sort of Self-consumption, a specific illness of man as a spiritual 
being, arising from his attempt to separate himself from the 
power which created him, or from the fact that he neglects 
what is eternal in him and forgets his spiritual nature. 
Whoever has no God has no Self and who has no self is in the 
despair . Despair forces a man to realize that he confronts a 
void and that he is infact responsible for his own sick and 
sinful condition, in the state of despair he is brought to 
recognize that what he despairs of are not the contingCTit facts 
that he claims to be the objects of his despair; the individual 
despairs of himself and to despair of oneself is to see oneself 
confronting an emptiness that cannot be filled by aesthetic 
pleasure or ethical rule . Moreover, it is in order to become 
conscious that one has brought oneself to this point. In 
analyzing despair, we recognize guilt; so too with dread. 
Kierkegaard contrasts the fear that has a specific and 
identifiable object with the dread that is objectless. In the 
experience of dread I become conscious of my bad will as 
something for which I am responsible, and vet which I did not 
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originate. Original sin is seen as a doctrine deduced from the 
analysis of experience. 
The word sin introduces a religious dimension which is 
not conveyed in the notion of pure moral guilt. Sin brings 
along a religious model for the understanding of guilt. The 
notion of existential estrangement does infact recapture an 
important element in "the traditional idea of sin. In 
existentialist philosophy, alienation implies alienation from 
oneself, from the possibil i ty of authentic existence. In 
religion, sin means separation from God. But the two kinds of 
separation are closely connected and each is linked also with a 
thi rd - Seperation from other human persons. 
According to exis tent ial is ts , human existence is prior 
to everything and for them first principle is man's making of 
himself as he is a project which possesses subjective life. 
SARTRE also takes his stand on the same doctrine that existence 
precedes essence, by which he means that man is not defined by 
a common quality of human nature but rather is what he wills to 
be . Since there is no God, a fundamental pos*~tulate of Sartre 's 
ontology, there is no concept of man in the mind of God which 
constitutes man's essence. Man does not come into the world 
ready-made; he is simply what he makes of himself, and is 
15 
never made but always in the making. 
Sartre has discussed in detail the fact ot Alienation in 
his writings. According to him there are two modes of being -
' being-in-itself and ' being-for-itself . Being-in-itself is the 
Self-contained being of a thing, a stone is a stone it is what it 
is and no more or l e s s . It means the being of a thing always 
coincides with itself only. On the contrary, 'being-for-itself 
is co-extensive with the realm of consciousness, and the nature 
of consciousness is that it is perpe-tually beyond itself. 
Accordingly Sartre holds that man in his existence, is always 
beyond this world, sometimes towards the future and sometimes 
outside of this world, and even transcends his own being. Man 
never possesses his being as he possesses a thing. Thus he 
never comes to the position of a thing that coincides with an 
object. This is only possible when he is not alienated from 
himself. 
According to Sar t re the human reality has the radical 
duality of the ' in-itself' and ' for-itself' and is made up of 
this duality. Whereas the in-itself is defined as a being 
"which is what it i s , man or the human reality is defined as a 
17 being, which is what it is not and is not what it i s " . 
Sartre points out that man is nihiliting nothingness, 
because if existence has no objective ground nor has any 
reference to any system of values, then, in this sense, 
conscious human existence is pure nothingness. In other words. 
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due to the fact that man constantly creates himself as well as 
the objective situation his empirical being is viewed as 
nothing. It can be inferred that to exist man must perpetually 
transcend himself or be alienated from himself. Paul Tillich 
holds. 
The State of existence is the state of 
estrangement. Man is estranged from the 
ground of his being, from other beings and 
from himself. 
From above it follows that man must abandoQ al l hopes 
of attaining a secure and harmonious integration with the 
surrounding objective world. Accordingly, in desiring, valuing 
and existing, man necessarily rejects this objective world in 
which he l i ve s . Therefore all projects which are turned towards 
the acceptance of the world as it is constituted imply a 
diminution of man's being and a loss of self respect in so far 
as they tend to reduce the tension which constitutes the 
necessary condition of free human action. Sartre in his "Being 
and Nothingness", points out that "Freedom is a lack of being in 
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relation to a given being". He is emphatic in asserting that 
the human reali ty is a detotalized totality (of in-itself and for-
i t se l f ) . Man is both in-itself and for-itself but the important 
thing is that the two dimensions of his being are radically 
different. 
Notning, absolutely nothing justifies ^e in 
adopting this or that particular scale of 
values. As a being by whom values exist, I 
am unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at 
being the foundation of values, while itself 
without foundation. 
According to Sartre, the pr ice of human existence is 
alienation from self, from God, from nature or material world and 
from society. Man is condemned to freedom. Sartre explains 
death, finitude and guilt from the stand-point of alienation. It 
is said that estranged from the ultimate power of being, Tian is 
determined by his finitude. His destiny is given over to his 
natural fate. He came from nothing and he returns to nothing. 
He is under domination of death and is driven by the anxiety of 
having to die. This infact is the answer to the question about 
the relation between Sin and death. 
For Sartre , the most important feature of human 
real i ty is the fact of Self-transcendence. All the anguish and 
tragedy of human existence can be traced to this source. .And it 
is this feature of human reality alone which constitutes its 
finitude. But for Heidegger on the contrary, death is the 
greatest source of anguish and the prime symbol of human 
finitude. He does not deny Self-transcendence. Sartre points 
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out that the awareness of death has value insofar as it obliges 
man. Moreover, he says that the awareness of death helps Tian 
to achieve authenticity. Therefore it is infact, nothing other 
than an impossible attempt to be for oneself the essence or the 
nature which one can only be for another. Sartre in his 'Being 
and Nothingness' remarks: 
The very existence of death alienates us 
wholly in our own life To be dead is to 
be a prey for the living. This means, 
therefore that one who tr ies to grasp the 
meaning of his future death must discover 
himself as the future prey of others. We 
21 have here , therefore, a case of alienation. 
This is In short , the existential exposition of 
alienation as elaborated by Sar t re . "Existentialism", he has 
written, "is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the 
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consequences of a coherent atheist ic position" . The discovery 
that there is no God and that man is alone is the begining of a 
genuine humanism that dignifies man as the free creator of all 
values and of whatever meaning there is in human existence. 
Sartre takes man as freedom. Man is free because he 
cannot be otherwise. He cannot escape his freedom, which 
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becomes for him, therefore a dreadful responsibility. But not 
only does one determine himself in his free choice, he also 
determines all o thers , for every decision he makes legislates for 
all men. Man is involved inevitably in anguish because his 
decision is never grounded in an external authority upon which 
he cEin rest the responsibility for his action. He must bear it 
alone. And when Sartre says alone, he means absolutely alone, 
no structure a priori for values to rest upon. Man's forlomess 
in his all-aloneness is which he must face the issue of his own 
freedom. For Sartre, that God does not exist is a dreadful fact 
that makes an ultimate difference to the world and to the man. 
HEIDEGGER has attempted to escape the designation of 
existential ist on the ground that his concern is with being in its 
unity and totality rather than with existence, but he quite 
clearly is a major factor in the whole existentialist movement. 
His begining point was the analysis of Dasein, an attempt to 
answer the question 'what is man' . Dasein i s , in Heidegger's 
usage, a term not entirely translatable that refers to the mode 
of human existence. 
The word "Dasein" is ordinarily translated as 
"existence". It is used in normal popular discourse. But 
Heidegger breaks it into i ts components "Da" "there" and Sein" 
"Being" and puts his own definition on i t . In general he means 
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man's conscious, historical existence in the world which is 
always projected into a there beyond its here. The German 
word Dasein has often been carried over into translations; the 
English s t r ikes me as preferable. The qualification "in every 
case mine" means that being there is allotted to me in order 
that myself should be being-there. Being-there is "in every 
case mine"; this means neither "posited through me" nor 
"apportioned to an individual ego". Being there is itself by 
virtue of i ts essential relation to being in general. That is the 
meaning of the sentence that occurs frequently in Sein and Zeit: 
23 Being-there implies awareness of being. 
Dasein which is always My Dasein, and is 
indefinable and indescribable, must be radically distinguished 
from existent things, designated as "Vorhanden" or "at hand". 
The existent things always belong to a genus and have 
describable quali t ies . It is possible therefore to determine 
thei r essence. But with Dasein there is no essence. Dasein is 
being, or "being there" . It expresses only existence. It is 
not given it is poss ib i l i ty . Man exists through his choices and 
his being therefore is entirely indeterminate. Animals and 
inanimate things "are there" because they are localizations in 
space and time but they do not exis t . Only man exists because 
only man has conscious awareness of his existence. To exist, to 
have an authentic being is to reflect on oneself, to be concerned 
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about oneself. True being i s Sel f -being, involving not only 
consciousness but r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and free decision as wel l . 
However the ind iv idua l i s not in total isolat ion. 
Human ex i s tence i s a be ing- in - the wor ld ; the self is in relation 
to the not-sel f , a not-se l f of o t h e r persons and th ings . Very 
s t r u c t u r e of ind iv idua l i s cons t i tu ted by th i s relation with 
o t h e r s and with t h e wor ld . T h e r e i s no escape from some 
involvement in socia l r e l a t i o n s . To effect such an escaoe, to 
ach ieve anonymity, would d e s t r o y authentic existence by 
des t roying a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a l l freedom and al l choice. This 
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would reduce t h e self to a th ing . 
Heidegger goes on to say tha t t h e "essence" of Dasein 
l i e s in i t s ex i s t ence and he exp l a in s t h i s to mean that Casein 's 
' e s s e n c e ' i s cons t i tu ted not by p r o p e r t i e s but by possible ways 
of being. He offers t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the sentence : Man 
has an essence such tha t he i s t he " t h e r e " , that is to say, the 
c lear ing of be ing . Th i s ' b e i n g ' of t h e t h e r e , and only t h i s , 
has the bas i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of e x i s t e n c e , that i s to say , the 
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e c s t a t i c s s tanding- in in t h e t r u t h of be ing . Heidegger t r i e s to 
avoid a pure ly sub j ec t i v i s t or 'man i s t h e measure of a l l th ings ' 
reading of h i s a s se r t i on that t h e "essence" of Dasein l ies in i t s 
ex i s t ence . It was jus t t h i s s u b j e c t i v i s t interpretat ion that 
S a r t r e placed upon Heidegger ' s sen tence , which in his phi losophy, 
. 26 
t akes the form : 'Ex i s t ence p r e c e d e s e s s e n c e ' . 
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Heidegger represents a specific form of Alienation, 
i . e . the despair of an individual who desperately wants to be 
himself. 
The individual is aroused from inauthentic existence 
and achieves an awareness of h is authentic existence in anguish 
and dread. The experience of dread like the "Sickness unto 
death" of Kierkegaard brings one to the profoundest level of 
human emotion. Unlike fear, which is always of some specific 
and threatening thing and therefore has a definiteness about i t , 
dread is an indefinite "feeling about", but not about any 
particular thing. It is not anything in the world, but the fact 
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of being-in-the world that produces dread. 
By dread we are held in suspense and it is in this 
suspense that Dasein is apprehended, for dread demands a choice 
betweai inauthentic impersonal existence and the genuine 
existence of Self-determination, it demands of a man that he 
takes upon himself his own dest iny. Here we are revealed as 
par t ia l , re lat ive, and finite - cast out upon a world in which 
all is worthless, homeless, hopeless, and forlorn beings that 
have no reason for being whose existence is a "being for death". 
Heidegger beleives that man is the being that knows he is going 
to d ie . He dies not only at the end of life but every day of 
i t . Death is certain yet infinite. Life is caste between nothing 
and nothing. Death is i ts boundary and is its supreme 
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possibi l i ty. To freely accept death, to live In it is presence 
and to acknowledge that for it there is no substitute and into it 
one must go alone, is to escape from all illusions and to achieve 
genuine dignity and authentic existence. 
For Heidegger "existence" is potential being, a 
possibil i ty of being or not being oneself. It anticipates the 
2R future, it projects itself into the world. As "the possibility 
of being oneself" it is authentic existence, as "the possibility of 
not being oneself" unauthentic existence. This is an interesting 
description of Self-estrangement. In unauthentic existence the 
Self loses itself in the "It" (Man), it behaves as a member of a 
crowd, like everybody or nobody, l ike the average man, it falls 
a prey to the temptations of this world and forgets its own 
mission. It talks superfically out of curiosity in an ambiguous 
manner. It handles what is "at hand". Heidegger claims that 
"being at hand" is ontologically more fundamental then "being 
there" and that the world is primarily the sphere of our 
ac t iv i t ies . 
Heideggers analysis of 'falling' (Verfallen) is closely 
related to anxiety. He relates anxiety to falling just as 
Kierkegaard had related it to the Sin. In Heidegger's view 
what happens in falling is that the existent flees froii hinself. 
He may lose himself in the busyness of his concerns with the 
world of things. ^et th is very fleeing from itself suggests that 
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the Dasein has in some way been already confronted with itself. 
The flight connected with falling is quite different 
from a flight arising from fear. Fear is always fear of some 
definite being with the world but what we are concerned with is 
the flight from oneself. 
Existentialism of JASPERS appears in its most complete 
form. In his concern with the full nature of being the ph 
ilosopher must return from the object world of things to his own 
situation, to himself, not as an object to be known with other 
objects, but as existing being, involved in concrete predicaments, 
in particular and peculair circumstances. Here he does not find 
universali ty, objectivity or knowledge. These are available only 
to the abstract ive intellect in i ts contemplation of the empirical 
,^ 29 world. 
The saying "Know thyself" is misleading. Man cannot 
know himself; he is his own greatest mystery. We have a 
knowledge of what we are not, but not of what we are. In his 
freedom man has an awareness of his humanity. He has no other 
essence than free choice. It is the task of the existential 
method to bring about the consciousness of freedom and of the 
absolute responsibili ty which it entails . It must bring the 
individual to a realization also of the existence of others by 
effecting communication with them. In the subjective search of 
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his private consciousness, man finds crises, freedoTi and 
decision, these are existence. The existent Self is not a being 
who is free and makes decisions. The self is the very freedom 
and the decisions which are made. It is Self-determining, 
determined by i ts own choice, which is both original and 
absolute. 
Man is alienated from his world. He comes from a 
dim past and goes into an indefinite future. Life is a flux 
in which he seeks anchor. Existence is rich in mysterious 
paradoxes and antinomies, such as those of freedom coexisting 
with dependence, communication with solitude, good with evil, 
truth with falsehood, happiness with grief, life with death, and 
30 progress with destruction. 
Philosophy of existence, says Jaspers^ is a way of 
thinking which uses and transcends all material knowledge, in 
order that man may again become himself. The articulation of 
th is system is based on three acts of transcending namely first a 
transcending to the universal in the realm of objects, eg. to the 
idea of the unity of science; secondly a transcraidence of the 
empirical data given in our knowledge, to an elucidation of our 
authentic being; and lastly the attempt to reach the Absolute 
in metaphysics. Authentic Existinz is disclosed through reason 
(Vemuft) while intellect (Verstand) concerns itself with the 
pragmatic management of existence. Verstand is satisfied with 
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practical results while vemuft engages in endless searching. 
Man is both vemuft and Existenz. 
A defining characteristic of man is his finitude, which 
he experiences as the limits to his existence. Jasper 's analysis 
of these boundry situations is the existential formulation of the 
problem of evi l . Authentic existence will push back these 
limits as far as possible and then accept them. Death is one of 
the most dramatic of these ba r r i e r s . It is the source of anxiety 
but it also elevates the sp i r i t . consciousness of the inevitable 
presence of death gives man courage and integrity. Guilt is 
another important boundary situation. Man not only feels guilty 
but because of his total freedom, is guilty. He always could 
have chosen otherwise. Ultimate guilt cannot be removed, it 
must be accepted and can thereby become constructive. Our 
guilt demonstrates the power that our freedom has over our 
destiny. The boundary of "situationality" is the fact that we 
are partially thrust and part ial ly choose ourselves into a 
particular human condition. We can be inauthentic and fall into 
these situation or be authentic and make them happen. Other 
31 important boundaries are chance, suffering and conflict. 
Freedom is central to man. It leads to the overriding 
importance of choice, which becomes the problem of moral 
responsibi l i ty. But man's freedom, which is destroyed by every 
attempt to achieve scientific knowledge of himself as a whole, is 
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not separable from his consciousness of his finite nature. His 
finiteness is the finiteness of all living things, a dependence 
upon natural environment and natural orocess, the finiteness of 
whatever must d ie . It is the finiteness of deoendence upon 
32 perceptual experience in human knowledge. 
When man becomes aware of his finiteness he 
transcends it by a consciousness of infiniteness, for his 
potentialities have no limit. He realizes that he has not created 
himself and positively seeks the one being, the absolute, which 
is the goal of metaphysics. In the face of insecurity, suffering, 
despair , conflict, violence, guilt and death which are the lot of 
existing being, man yet goes forward with his eyes open and 
undeceived but with a faith that enables hira to transcend the 
world and his situation in i t , to achieve being-in-itself. Such 
transcendence is the total perspective that is gained not by 
objective knowledge but by genuine participation in life. For 
Jaspers the achievement of transcendence does not involve God. 
Awareness of transcendence originates in the consciousness of our 
finitude. Through our boundaries we recognize the infinite 
possibil i t ies within us . The world itself points to a region 
beyond. 
Existential Philosophy is Self-disclosure through 
communication. Even being itself, althougn it can be represented 
only in chipers as symbols, is made transparent soleiv through 
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authentic communication. Existential communication is neither 
friendship nor psychotherpy, it is not fusion, esteem or 
unanimity; it is s t r ic t ly speaking as with Existenz itself, 
ineffable. 
But finally human existence is a failure. There is no 
escape from man's limits espacially the limit of death, yet man 
is condemned to endless str iving. In this dreadful paradox 
between finite existence and striving for infinity man finds the 
ultimate symbol of his salvation, which is transcendence. 
Man can search for transcendence by various means. 
He can exolore the world as science does or he can search for 
it by examining the relation between himself and the world as 
we find it in epistemology, ethics and Psychology. 
Jaspers expresses the antecedents of existentialism in 
the following sentences: 'what is new about this age is 
that man becomes conscious of being as a whole, of himself and 
his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his 
own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face 
with the void, he s t r ives for liberation and redemption. By 
consciously recognizing his l imits , he sets himself the highest 
goals. He experiences absoluteness in the depths of selfhood and 
34 in the lucidity of transcendence. 
107 
Jasper described Alienation as "Provision for the 
masses in planned production with the help of technical 
^ • -.35 devices". 
He is concerned about the person who is in danger of 
becoming a cog and who loses his substance, self and his 
spiri tual centre. Jaspers wants to show the way from the 
unauthentic existence of mass-man to the authentic existence of 
the self. 
i08 
According to CAMUS, we live in a world the character 
of which is basically absurd so that we can only rebel against 
i t . Camus contributed in a significant way to existentialist 
philosophy. The 20th century with two great world wars 
witnessed the barbarity and inhuman nature of human beings 
which was the result of dehumanization uner gigantic 
development of industry and technology. Dehumanization is 
synoiv\»^wous with man's alienation from himself. Camus is 
part ial ly concerned with this issue. What camus wishes to 
affirm against the dehumanization is a renewed sense of the 
human, which proves his message to be very much in the main 
stream of existentialist thought. 
So as an existentialist camus is also concerned with 
the problem of Alienation. The only difference between him 
and other existentialists is that camus consider life as Absurd 
and therefore, in his view man is lost in absurdity. Whatever 
can, give meaning to an Individual life is to overcome life 's 
absurdi ty . In his first novel The outsider (L' Etranger) he 
confines himself to Absurdity of life. Not only this , he 
emphasizes the meaninglessness of life as well as death in his 
other writings with great existential pathos and artist ic 
dexter i ty . Some other existentialists also hold the view that 
life is meaningless. For instance Sartre argues that man's 
existence is grounded in nothingness. It means that he is free 
to give meaning to his life and environment in whatever way 
lOS 
he decides. Sartre holds that though the universe is 
meaningless, yet human existence is not. He says that meaning 
enters into the world with Being-for-itself. i . e . Human 
existence. Camus in his ear l ier phase does not agree with this 
view. His philosophy begins with absurdity of life and ends 
with absurdity of death. Sartre and other existentialists hold 
that death completes the meaning of life. This is the point of 
departure in carau's concept of absurdity. This indicates his 
concept of alienation. Heidegger considers man lost in the 
society and deprived of his freedom as absurd entity. 
Exercising one's freedom and overcoming the world is the way 
to make life meaningful. Jaspers is of the view that the entire 
contemporary world predetermined and dominated by technocracy 
and bureaucracy reduces individual human existence to 
meaningless being. In order to make it meaningful man has to 
transcend this world and also his own existence. In camu's 
The outsider there is no suggestion now absurdity can be 
overcome and life be made meaningful. But in his other 
writings we find an existential struggle to overcome absurdity 
of life. In his philosophical works, like Reble and Myth of 
Sysiphus, this attempt is obvious. 
Camu's concept of absurdity of life leads him to his 
concept of outsider. Actually his outsider is an individual who 
is alienated from his society and his ownself. The outsider is 
perhaps the most notable modem attempt to describe a man 
unrelated to anything or anyone at all , a man for whom 
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everything is meaningless, a man who murders and feels 
nothing, a man who ends his tale of "nothingness" and aosurdlty 
by saying "for all to be accomplished, for me to feel less 
lonely, all that remained to hope was that on the day of my 
execution there should be a huge crowd of spectators and that 
they should great me with howls of execration". His 
indifferencti at the news of his mothers death and at her funeral 
also indicate his attitude towards life and death both of which 
seem to be absurd to him. Camus from the begining regarded 
certain responses to absurdity as morally unacceptable. In his 
le t ters to German Friend (1943-44) he interpreted Nazism as one 
reaction to the very nihi l is t ic vision of the world that he 
37 himself had come to accept. He then went to condemn it in 
the severest terms for i t s denial of human fraternity. Even at 
th is stage in the development of his thought camus insisted 
that an authentic revolt against the human condition had to be a 
revolt in the name of the solidari ty of man with man. 
Death is seductive: • I understand that m^i sometimes 
wish to die because, when life is revealed in all its 
transparency, nothing is important any longer. Treinsparency 
means the way in which the concrete world dissolves into near-
emptiness. This tempts man and fills him with a death-wish 
which may take the form of suicide. Such a death-wish 
haunted camus, but it disgusted as well as tempted him. When 
he describes his stay in prague he depicts the disintegration 
of human character. Habit protects man, as do friends and 
i l l 
most interestingly words. But travel breaks down such things 
and compels man to face his emptiness. He is not a journalist 
or an office-worker or whatever he thought he was. Tne 
various trai ts of his character such as bravery, generosity or 
kindness crumble and leave him without any personality. This 
frightens him and he may plunge into violence or madness in 
order to escape from the anguish which is the mark of his 
e 
condition. Conversly man may live most intensely in such 
moments because he participates in the beauty of the universe. 
When caraus emerges from bathing and greates his friends: he 
was saturated with delight and bleached by the sun. 
Disintegration of self may be a liberation from the tedious ties 
of everyday life. At these moments the primitive of camus 
exulted in the beauty he felt around himself. 
Meursault the ' he ro ' of the stranger, trusts only his 
own experience and dismissses philosophy and tradition. He is 
watchful, observent of the detai ls of human life and cosmic 
situations, in all the i r mainifestations and details . However he 
doesn't find any ultimate standard of justification of his 
personal actions as well as the social responses thereof. There 
are no ideological or philosophical norms by reference to which 
he could pronounce moral judgements and examine his personal 
behaviour as well as the social reactions therearound. It 
seems to him that all actions as well as situations are de-
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troupe; and no ethical or philosophical criteria can be deemed 
to be ultimate and absolute in view of the fact that all 
standards, in order to be justifiable need other standards of 
evaluation and so an add infintum. We can nowhere stop and 
accept any set of given standards as beyond the Ken of 
critisisra. Therefore human life as well as cosmic situation 
seems to be normless and Meursault finds himself in a 
meaningless and absurd life-situation. 
He stands, in fact outside the whole moral world in 
a peculair state that camus describes as "innocence", apparantly 
because in a world that affords no transcendential sanction for 
human judgements of right and wrong there can be no real guilt. 
His relationship to his mother and to his mistress are devoid 
of feeling, and he eventually k i l l s an Arab for no particular 
reason. But at the very end of the novel, after Meursault, 
facing execution, has burst into a rage against a priest who 
t r ies to persuade him to accept the reality of his guilt and the 
possibil i ty of redemption. There is a long semipoetic passage 
in which he declares his love of the world and it is senscious 
imedicacy and speaks tenderly and almost lovingly of his 
fellowmen and of their common fate, which he shares. Camus 
wishes to persuade us that these two aspects of Meursaults 
character are not just consistent but intimately related to one 
another, but again he experienced difficulty in showing how a 
posit ive ethic of human fraternity can be generated by a 
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nihi l is t ic attitude towards all values. 
The utter absurdity of life is indicated by 
Meursault's utter rejection of one life-situation or life-style for 
another one. All life situations and life-styles or states of 
affairs are as good or as bad as any. How can we sit in 
judgement on a particular life-situation and pronounce it either 
good or bad. Kierkegaard in his exposition of the existential 
dialectic trifurcates human life into aesthetic, ethical and 
religious stages. It so seems that he regards religious stages 
to be higher then the aesthetic stage. It is so because 
Kierkegaard affirms man's relationship to God and God as 
revealed in scriptural texts becomes the ultimate standard of 
justification. However camusischaracter i . e . Meursault fails to 
differentiate in between various given situations of life. 
Possibily it sounds presumptuous to him to accept religious or 
ethical criterion to be justifying or presiding factors that a- re 
widely beleived to be controlling and guiding in multiplex given 
situations of life. Meursault is sceptic as well as a nihilst . 
Possibly he thinks that it is we who confer meanings and 
values to various life-situations and contexts. Our judgements 
are arbi t rary and lacking in any authority. We can choose 
among various alternatives but al l alternatives are devoid of 
any logic or meaning e.g. when Meursalts boss asks him about 
going over to paris and attend to a business project over 
i l . 
there, adding that he was a young man and parisian life must 
be more at t ract ive for him, Meursalt r e p l i e s ; . . . . "you could 
never change your life, that in any case one life was as good 
40 
as another and that I wasn't all dissatisfied with mine here. 
Meursalt further muses with himself, "he looked upset and told 
me that I always evaded the question and that I had no 
ambition, which was disastrous in the business world so I went 
back to work. I would rather not have upset him, but I could 
not see any reason for changing my life. Come to think of i t , 
I wasn't unhappy. When I was a student, I had plenty of that 
sort of ambition. But when I have to give up ray studies I 
41 
very soon realised that none of it really mattered". 
Camus developed a kind of existentialism of the 
absurd and has been described as an 'anti- theist ' rather than 
an theis t . For him, sisyphus is the symbol of mankind-the 
ancient hero who was condemned to spend his days rolling a 
boulder to the top of a h i l l , always to see it escape him and 
crash back down to the bottom. In "The myth of Sisyphus" 
camus believed that absurdity, in the sense of recognition and 
acceptance of the fact that there are no metaphysically 
guaranted directives for conduct^ could by itself generate a 
positive ethic. In particular, the ideal of human fraternity 
was connected with camus's heroic nihilism on the grounds that 
to accept oneself as the sole guarantor of one's own values 
would necessarily involve accepting a principle of respect for 
other human beings. 
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It was the injustice and crueltv of man to man tnat 
aroused caraus to action. Like many of the existentialists, 
caraus s t i l l tried to present these two revolts - the revolt 
against the human condition and the revolt against hu'nan 
injustice - as essentially continuous with one another. 
Neverthless, he came to feel that the relationship between 
these two revolts had been misconceived and that tne 
misconception was at the heart of twentieth - century 
totalitarianism, to which he was as resolutely opposed in its 
communistic as in i t s Nazi Version. Caraus gradually came to 
believe that the reason for the extraordinary miscarriage of the 
soviet revolution was that the revolutionary tradition had its 
roots in a revolt against the human condition as such, and that 
such a revolt can never lead to human fraternity but leads 
instead to a new enslavement of man by man. This radical 
revision of his ear l ier views found its full expression in 
camus's second main philosophical essay, 'The Rebel'. 
The Rebel begins with the problem of murder or with 
the problem of political justification for the killing of human 
beings. For camus political action is essentially violent revolt 
and it thus inescapably raises the question whether one has the 
right to take the life of another human being. Camus rejects 
metaphysical revolt , which he sees as a radical refusal of the 
human condition as such, resulting ei ther in suicide or in a 
demonic attempt to depose God and remake the world in the 
image of man. Its deepest motive is not a love for mankind but 
i i 6 
a desire to destroy the world as it i s . 
What camus puts in La Paste is a forlorn confusion at 
the absurdity of life. The novel is a factual account 
reminscent of Journalism, of the Plague in 1940s in French port 
on Algerian coast. The Plague is the early concept of the 
absurd, a secularised sense of tragedy and an analysis of the 
way a meaningless death gratituously calls into question a life 
without meaning, or a life amounting at best, to no more than 
42 death. It can be read at different levels - a stark 
description of the Plague and at a deeper level as a depiction 
of the absurdity of life where vital living has beai restrained 
by habi ts . The description of the rates and the reactions of 
the people, show how habits restrain common sense. The dead 
rates are meaningless and not associated with the wide 
spread Plague. 
The story of the novel is a telling commentary on 
the absurd life situation man is caught in. Dr. Rieux, who is 
the surgeon narrator of the novel starts the story by 
discovering a dead ra t . The story ends with several thousands 
of dead rats plus the Plague's first death-monsieur Michel. 
As the story progresses the situation worseness. Day in and 
day out more and more ra ts and flees die and scavengers have 
a tough time, in clearing them. One day it so happens that 
rats from all quarters spring up on roads, basements, cellars 
and sewers and die in thousands. One could hear the shril l of 
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l i t t le dearth cries of the ra t s . Kven in the oosh areas o: the 
town one could find them in heaps. After every clean uo the 
rats would again aooear in increasing numbers and oeopie 
started crying for extra-ordinary official measures to combat 
this menace. The official reaction is throughly routinized and 
bureacratic. A friend of Dr. Rieux Jean Tarron is the only 
person who keeps a note book on the progress of Plague and 
can sense the significance of the dying rats and their decaying 
bodies. As the Plague star ts taking i ts toll Rieux bnd Tarron 
discover another Plague like Phenomenon - the red-tape of 
bureaucracy. Dr. Rieux is convinced that persons suffering 
from unidentified fever should be isolated. However, he can 
not do anything in view of the fact that his colleagues insist 
that they have no definite proof that the fever is highly 
infectious. The Doctor cannot certify what the disease is 
although horrified at the daily toll which the disease takes. 
The doctor discovers that the local magisterate need also to be 
consulted in this regard. The municipal officials are also 
taking it easy. The people in general are leading a monotonous 
life, almost l ike mechanical roberts . There is an all round 
lack of understanding of the" gravity of the situation. 
Thus the novel The Plague has an allegorical 
significance. It is an allegory on the meaning of living and 
meaning of death. Life is not a bed of roses but at least as 
bad as the Plague. Realization of the essential tragic character 
of the existence is the only feature worth eulogising, infact the 
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only redeeming feature. The central the-ne of the novel is 
again the absurdity of human existence. The rats examplify 
common people and the indifferent bureaucracy and government 
represent the indifference of the universal order if any to the 
deepest predicament of human struggle. Again camus reverts to 
this favourite theme by depicting man as caught in the coils of 
existence and forsaken and forgotten by the unconcerned gods he 
has been living in. Again human existence is represented as 
alienated in view of the overwhelming absurdity of hunian 
condition - a condition where everybody seems diseased and yet 
everybody seems unconcerned about everybody. 
Even in camus's calligula we find tragedies and 
suffering of human existence. Caligula is a -lay about the 
young Roman emperor who brutally ki l ls his courtiers. At the 
outset of the play caligula is shocked by the death of his 
s i s te r , DrusuUa, with whom he has been having an incenstuous 
love affair. He sets out to revenge her death in a rivalry of 
killing that lasts untill he is assassinated by the particians he 
has tormented. 
Drusil la 's death has plunged calligula into a dualistic 
universe where he is confronted by otherness. He has a 
personal God. Drusilla 's death has demonstrated that man is 
at the mercy of gods; his only significant acts are those which 
assume the God's prerogatives, namely suicide and murder. 
There is a imtc between violence and totality. Caligula has a 
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death wish. He feels a kinship with his victims and he courts 
assassination. Conversly he ki l ls in order to achieve the 
immortality which the gods have until now, kept for themselves. 
Calligula cannot bear the pain that he feels; "my skin 
hurts me, my chest and limbs too I have only to move my 
tongue and everything turns black and people become loathsome 
to me." This is the anguish of man's mortal condition and 
Calligula has a special place in camus's early writings in view 
of the same. Sisyphee finds reasons to be happy while 
Stranger depicts morality as an absence, in Calligula it is 
presented as a mind trapped in a confrontation with what it is 
not. Since the emperor cannot stand this he is overwhelmed by 
hatred of others and of himself. Yet murder offers no solution 
because the murderer 's supposed joy is as finite as everything 
else . When he has killed one person Calligula, like all other 
ter ror is ts has no choice but to kil l someone else. Whatever he 
does, he remains an object of hatred to himself. In one act 
Calligula destroys the mirror confronting him as he can no 
longer stand the sight of himself, ' i t is always you I meet, 
44 you are always there opposite me and I hate you' . Calligula 
cannot bear the burden of guilt . Everyone is guilty because 
there are no judges who could declare that men are innocent. 
Thus in Calligula camus does not merely bring out 
the meaninglessness of life but makes death and tragedies of 
human existence the core and the crux of this drama. He says 
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that 'Death is an ordinary incident. While uttering this I take 
45 
oath that it i s the definite simple rea l i ty ' . Human suffering 
in an absurd world is central to the theme of the drama. 
Le Mythe de Sisphe is a philosophical essay which 
explores the existential predicament of man. In this novel 
Sisyphus is a Greek mythological character who was accused of 
having divulged secret of gods. He had seen Jupiter 
kidnapping Isma - the daughter of Esyphus which he reported 
to her father. The gods had condemned Sisyphus to spend 
eternity pushing a rock up a h i l l and watching it roll back 
down when it reached the top. Sisyphus' condition according 
to caraus, constitutes what may be called the state of the 
absurd. Camus has tr ied to convey that man in this universe 
is condemned l ike Sisyphus to perennial struggle which 
del ivers no resu l t s . In fact "Le Myth de Sisphe" is a story 
of human destiny and Sisyphus symbolizes the meaninglessness 
and absurdity of both human life and universal order. Man is 
in a continious journey but reaches nowhere. Human life is a 
s tory of ceaseless suffering. Man would like to make his life 
pleasant and peaceful by following great ideals and values. 
However he encounters hurdles at every step and all his 
projects are doomed to failure and extinction. Man is 
subservant to certain blind forces which can not be exactly 
pin-pointed. All human and social ideals turn out to be 
farcical. The practical life cares a fig for our ideals and 
values. We cann't l iberate ourselves from this life - situation 
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even by faithfully following all the best ideals of the world. 
There is no point in involving the blessing of God for there is 
none. We are surrounded by opaque hurdles and impassable 
wal ls . There is no logical or rational justification for these 
hurdles . All human endeavour is futile. Man seems to be a 
toy in the hands of destiny and death seems to be the only 
exit from the torture chamber of existence. This view of 
human existence as culled out from camu's writings is a 
devastatingly radical reinterpretation of human condition in the 
overall scheme of so called universal order. Human existence 
is a continuous confrontation with a universe oozing out, so to 
say, absurdity from all i t s pores . No interpretation, no view 
point and no theoritical construction seems to clinch the issue. 
Man is robbed by his metaphysical garments and finds himself 
naked of meaning and innocent of value in contemporary life-
situation. 
As pointed out by Patrick McCarthy, "The simplest 
definition of the absurd would be rephrasing of Descarts' 
proposition, ' I think therefore I am ' . Camus might have stated 
that , "I am another to myself, therefore I am". The absurd is 
not a state to be overcome because i t represents a victory over 
the previous state of suicidal mysticism. Yet it remains a 
religious vision because man does not forget his need for God 
and becomes a pragmatist who is content to give a shape to his 
ear thly existence. Camus's orginality lays in his attempt to 
preserve man's religious sense although it could not be 
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satisfied and to make him live in the absence of God" 46 
The real meaning of Sisyphee is expressed in lyrical 
passage which depict the absurd as an adventure. We must 
accept the heart-rending marvellous gamble of the absurd, make 
a serious effort to do it and face the blast of consequences 
thereof. Only then will man's body, his nobility, his 
tenderness e tc . recover their place in this absurd world. His 
greatness will be nourished by the wine of absurd and the 
47 bread of indifference. For camus the absurd is the conflict 
between man's desire for meaning and the shapelessness of his 
condition. Dignity is the way to transcent that condition. 
Sisyphus attains it when he affirms his superiority over the 
rocks. 
Camus' novels and dramas are not written for the 
sake of art nor do they preach any new-fangled idealogy. His 
works bring out the significant social, political and 
philosophical problems of modem age. They reflect the 
deepest issues of human existence. Such questions as; why 
should man undergo so much suffering; what are the factors 
responsible for human suffering; are those factors external and 
circumstantial or internal and personal; are values or ideas 
inspired by genuine and authentic commitment or motivated by 
Selfishness, hypocracy and economic profit etc; are addressed 
to in his writings and his novels revolve round them. His 
responses and reflections to these questions add upto what may 
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be called Absurdism. This philosophy of absurdisra is 
possibly a function of the crises of contemporary civilization. 
And the concept of this absurdism leads man to the concept of 
outsider. The basic problem of "The outsider" is his 
instinctive rejection of the everyday world, a feeling that it is 
somehow boring and unsatisfying like a hypnotized man eating 
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saw dust under the belief that it is eggs and bacon. 
Actually, the outsider 's sense of unreality cuts off his freedom 
in an unreal world as it is to jump while one is falling. 
Freedom being intensity of will is not something to do what one 
l ikes and will depends upon motive. If there is no motive, 
there is no willing, one cannot do anything unless he believes 
that to be meaningful. And belief must be believed on the 
existence of something, in other words we can say belief is 
concerned with what is Real. Beliefs are bom out of our 
convictions about the reality of the things we are surrounded 
by . When nothing is or seems rea l , how can we against all the 
pressures of our so-called conscience as well as common sense 
go on deluding ourselves to l ive and die for any set of beliefs. 
An existential illumination or analysis leads us to pos^itulate 
that we are living in an unreal world and we accept this 
reali ty in the marrow of our being. This sense of unreality 
hinders us from participating in life and we become alienated 
from those who participate. 
CHAPTER V 
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR DEALIENATION 
Alienation cannot be fully overcome as long as there 
are multiple accounts of the source and nature of alienation. 
The basis of alienation l ies in the existence of a plura.lity of 
philosophies which never allow man to view himself under one 
pattern only. Of course Marx thinks his proposed revolution in 
the control of material sources of power can eliminate 
Alienation. However that can only come about if all men accept 
Marx with interpretation of his teachings. This is not possible 
as for as intellectual freedom is concerned. Those who regard 
Self-alienation as a psychological fact, dispute importance of 
any external changes in circumstances and suggest the 
Individuals own moral effort, i . e . a revolution within the Self, 
as the only cure. Those who regard Self-alienation as a result 
of the neurotic process are consistents in offering a 
pychoanalytical treatment. 
Self-alienation reveals itself as a dynamic and 
comprehensive attempt to avoid the painful experience of inner 
conflict. By remaining alienated from himself and detached from 
others, the patient avoids the anxiety connected with emotional 
involvement in conflict. But he pays for this with a steadily 
increasing restriction of his life, his feelings and his wants, 
he pays with a loss of his self. 
Self-alienation is unaviodiable result of the neurotic 
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process. Simultaneously, it is an active move against the real 
Self: 
1. Alienation prevents disturbing Self-awareness. The alienated 
patient often complains of being "in a fog" but unconciously 
he wants to stay in i t . He welcomes Self-anesthesia. 
2 . Alienation in the sense of conforming like an automation, 
protects him from the burden and the responsibility of 
commitment to himself and his idraitity. It permits Self-
alienation. 
3 . Alienation, in i ts most active form, is the rejection of being 
oneself and the attempt to become the other, the ideal Self. 
It means escape from the hated Self through Self 
idealization. 
These three ways, in which the "despair as not being 
willing to be oneself" finds expression, were already described 
by Kierkegaard. He called loss of the Self "Sickness unto 
death". The first way to avoid consciousness of the Self: 
By diversions or in other ways e.g. by work and 
busy occupations as means of distract ions, he seeks to preserve 
an obscurity about his condition, yet again in such a way that 
i t does not become quite clear to him that he does it for this 
reason (that he does what he does in order to bring about 
obscuri ty)" . 
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The second way "to avoid willing to oe oneself" is 
willing to be s imo ly the conventional Self: 
"By becoming wise about how things go in this world, 
such a man forgets h i m s e l f . . . . finds it too venturesome to 
t h ink , to be himself , for eas ie r and safer to be l ike the o the rs , 
to become an imi ta t ion , a number, a c ioher in the crowd. 
This form of d i s p a i r i s h a r d l y ever noticed in world. Such 
a man p rec i se ly by losing himself in th is way has gained 
1 
pe r fec tab i l i ty in ad jus t ing" . 
Kierkegaard h e r e an t ic ipa tes what today has become a 
mass Dhenomenon : Self-elimination through conforming 
"adjustTient". 
The t h i r d most rad ica l way "to avoid willing to be 
2 
oneself" is wil l ing to become someone e l s e . Neurotics want to 
free themselves from the burden they exper ience the i r actual self 
to be , escape into fan tasy , and t r y to become that ideal other 
self they feel t hey should b e . 
To get r i d of h i s hated self is the pervas ive 
motivation of t h e masoch is t . Ear ly self rejection and act ive 
Self-al ienation a r e t h e roots of masochis ts and homosexual t r ends . 
Self-eJimination and ident if icat ion with somebody else gives 
neuro t ics fan tas t ic h a o p i n e s s as they get temporari ly free from 
t h e i r hated self , but it a lso d r i v e s them into the Self-
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destructive morbid-dependency relationshio. 
Actually Intellect and feeling must be harmonised if 
Self-alienation is to be overcome. If the harmony of intellect 
and feeling is neglected, a disproportion in the human soul is 
bound to appear. Whether this reconcilation comes in religion, 
in art or in a life of action, we cannot assume the removal of 
alienation untill we have experienced such final harmony. Even 
then this cannot be the way for all men. 
Philosophers and Sociologists hold that individuals are 
passive products of the Social organization, that the whole of 
Social organization is determined by the organization of economic 
life and that all is dependent on the question of whether the 
means of production are or are not private property. 
In criticizing "the materialist doctrine that mai are 
products of circumstances and upbringing" Marx stressed that, ' i t 
Is men that change circumstances and of human activity can be 
conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing 
3 
practice ( P r a x i s ) ' , 
Those who have tried to eloborate such a conception 
have insisted that deallenation of individuals and dealienation of 
society are closely connected. One cannot be carried without the 
other . It is possible to create a social system that would 
unable and even stimulate the development of dealienated 
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individuals, but is impossible to organize a society tr.at would 
automatically produce such individuals. A non-alienated 
individual is an individual who fulfills himself as a free and 
creative being of praxis , and free creativity is not something 
that can be forced upon anyone from outside. An individual can 
become free only through his own act ivi ty. 
It is only the communist mode of production, Marx 
felt, that alienation could be overcome. For in that mode of 
production the worker would be the master of the process of 
production. Consequently he would b3 in a oosition to 
reappropriate his lost p rax is . Thus in the comrr. ust node of 
production the objectification of the worker's la: ^r .vill not 
prove alienation. 
De-alienation of society and individual is an 
interlinked affair. Social and individual aspects of alienation 
are the two faces of one and the same human realitv. One 
influences and is influenced by the other . Once we believe that 
alienation is inherent in the very nature of man i .e . it has an 
ontological growth of i ts own, it is difficult to think of a life 
which is completely free from all types of alienation. 
Those who like Heidegger and Sartre are oarn.tted to 
the ontological notion of alienation will always be tormented by a 
sense of lack, whatever might be their socio-economic 
4 
conditions. A man is and remains lonely in the world despite 
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the presence of others around him. His loneliness and craving for 
something else is a crucial fact of l i fe. His desire for oeing 
something other than what he i s , is inherent in him. It sustains 
him. The meaning of all human actions can be understood only in 
terms of our efforts to remove the imperfection. This brings out 
the creative implication of alienation. Our awareness, isolation 
and creativity are proofs of what we are yet to be. We need 
deeper integration in our life, both within and without. We want 
to overcome our possivity. By creating new things, we enlarge 
our area of inherited freedom. It is by continously overcoming 
our limitations, that we have moved beyond barbarism to 
savagery, from savagery to the development of culture and 
civilization. 
To exist as a self is to stand in the possibility of 
becoming at one with oneself or of being divided in oneself. To 
existent ial is ts , these two possibil i t ies are to exist 
'authentically' or ' inauthentically ' . An authentic man is one who 
recognizes the radical duality between the human and non-human. 
According to existent ial is ts , man must l ive in the world; and 
being-in-the-world (which constitutes his conscious and purely 
authentic being), in which man recognizes his existence and 
knows his potentialities does not imply being-in-the-midst-of-the-
world (which is the state of human inauthenticity, in which man 
loses his existence in the artificial man-made world which is the 
world transformed by human technology). They hold that an 
authentic life is one which is based upon an exact assessment of 
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human condition, while in in-authentic state man beco.ties 
forgetful of the ontological roots of his very being. The 
ontologlcal necessities of human condition, existentialists hold, 
are degraded in the state of fallenness or inauthentlcity. In-
authenticity is the outcome of alienation and authenticity means 
de-alienation. 
Iqbal ' s poetry and prose suggest to readers a straight 
way of dealienation. In the light of his concept of 'ego' or 
Khudi he asks man to overcome his manifold alienation. He is 
of the view that for a creative human person isolation from the 
world or detachment from the external circumstances is necessary, 
Poet 's withdraw! from society and his feelings of loneliness is 
a healthy state of creative self that does not accept alienation. 
Here isolation is aimed at strengthening one's individuality and 
rejecting the fallen state of day-to-day being. It is rather 
first step towards de-alienation and a revolt against dehumanised 
society. With the product of his creative activity an artist 
or peot recovers his authentic self and establishes a new 
relation with nature and society by parti cipatiing through his 
creative activity in reshaping human society and creating human 
values. 
According to Iqbal , man should create his own world 
if he be amongst the living: ^t^^L-(J^^JjJSj jf\J\X^^^L^\L^JC,J 
Human existence Sartre holds , lies bevond thought and it moves 
towards transcendence that offers a field for personal venture. 
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According to Karl Jaspers : 
As human beings we are never Self-sufficient; we are 
not our own goal only but relate to Transcendence. It enhances 
us and simultaneously enables us to see through ourselves and 
realize that we are no th ing . . . . Freedom and Transcendence lead 
to a basic consciousness. 
Sartre sets up a distinction between pour-soi and en-
soi, and argues that values emerge as a result of the insertion 
of the former into the la t ter . In other words according to him 
values are expression of the Pour-soi 's striving towards 
identification with the unattainable en-soi. The nihiliting 
movement of Sa r t r e ' s Persoi towards its possibilities is really an 
essential mode of overcoming alienation, or that which Iqbal calls 
estrangement or separation \J^J^ L t/l/^or deprivation ^ QJ^^ 
which is a recurrent theme in Iqbals most significant poetry. 
Man's longing and loneliness is his exclusive privilage because 
according to Iqbal the totality of the world of non-human beings 
is not prompted by this unique des i re . He says 
Rivers, mountains, the moon and s tars - what do they know of 
separation and longing! The pain of separation - it makes me 
alone; this dust - i t alone has known separation. 
According to Sartre as well as Iqbal a creative being 
is condemned to alienation that produces an undying urge for 
bringing out man's hidden creative potentialities to overcome 
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alienation. Both of them hold that for a creative human 
individual estrangement from the dehumanised world or 
detachment from other external circumstances that reduce 
Being-for-oneself to day-to-day-being is very essential. Only 
in such a situation does man's creative impulse find a fruitful 
soil and he can create and reshape his world according to 
his aspirations. 
Iqbal in his later Poetry suggests a way 
to dealienation. His 'authentic man' or mu'min (Ideal Man 
( / DJ>/*t.C^Ojj/) is the vicegerant -<*——^ I* of God 
(on ear th) , who has bestowed upon him His unique Attributes 
like knowledge, wisdom, freedom, creativity, power, patience, 
justice, consciousness, love, sympathy etc. 
So we see Human life as an endless journey. It is 
a perpetual dialectic of alienation and dealienation. It 
provides man with mobility transit ivity and creativity. 
In this journey of human life, whenever man becomes alive 
to certain questions he becomes an outsider. So the 
problem of an outsider is essentially a living problem. 
There is an apoetite for progress in all outsiders. 
For the outsider, the world into which he has been bom 
is always a world without values. Compared to his own 
appetite for a purpose and a direction the way most men 
live is not living at a l l , it is drifting. Unless he can 
evolve a set of values that will correspond to his own 
higher intensity of purpose, he may as well throw 
himself under a vehicle for he will always be 
a misfit. Cleopatra (an instance from Roman history) 
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was found of sticking gold pins into her slave g i r l ' s - breasts 
and derived gratification from their screems. Man everywhere 
and whoever he may be has preferred to act as he chose and not 
the least as his reason dictated. Whatever man wants is simply 
independent choice. Whatever that independ^ice may cost and 
wherever it may lead. 
But do such freedom not lead us into a complete 
individualism? If everyone is unique, are we not going to end up 
with a chaos in which everyone does his own thing. And is this 
not an exaggerated liberty? Sartre has written, "you are free, 
therefore choose - that is to say, invent. No rule of General 
morality can show you what you ought to do; no signs are 
7 Vouchsafed in th is world". Sartre means that there is no God 
who establishes values of humanity. Every man must invent his 
own values and he exists authentically in so far as he strives to 
realize values that really are his own. 
Modem man alienated from nature, from his Gods and 
from society in a depersonalised world is unable to achieve an 
identity and a relatedness to o thers . If there is anything that 
modem man regards as infinite it is no longer God, morality, 
nature or culture but it is his own power. And this power 
destroy to reduce to nothingness lies in our own hands. It is 
we who are infinite. On the one hand man is exercising 
freedom, will, decision, creat ivi ty, setting goals and striving for 
their attainment, he appears as a being possessed as 
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Schleiermacher expressed i t , with a 'sense and the taste for tne 
infinite' . On the other hand we have seen him in his 
' th rowness ' , a being of care and temoorality, finally abandoned 
to death, so that his taste for the infinite is anchored to a 
radical finitude. We have seen him in his essential socialitv as 
a being-with-others, capable of love and community. We have 
also seen that man is a being of conscience, aware of destiny to 
be fulfilled. But against this is to be set his Alienation. 
So conflict and tension becomes the dynamic reality of 
human existence. And in such conflicting tendencies, nothinc 
make sense, human existence fundamentally becomes absurd. iust 
as there are profound conflicts and tensions in existence itself, 
so there are differences among the existentialists as to ho» the 
threatening and destructive tendencies in man can be overcome. 
Kierkegaard seems very close to Heidegger when he 
wri tes: 'The temporal is a sna i l ' s space, spreading out in time 
and space; the eternal is the intensive which hurries to ftieet 
death". 
If we utilize the expression of PaUL Tillich, it is in 
an 'ultimate concern' that finally gathers up the many proximate 
concerns of life and brings a unity and wholeness ;nto 
10 
existence. Accordinig to Paul Till ich, ' Nietzche is the most 
impressive and effective representative of what could be called a 
"Philosophy of life", the principle of which is 'the will' 
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11 power. By this he means the power that preserves and 
enhances life amids the struggle for survival, and therefore runs 
through all existence. ' It is a principle whereby man consciously 
orders the available possibil i t ies of his environment, and to 
reach this sort of mastery one must be disciplined, must first of 
12 
all master himself and his own capacities' . The Buddha also 
spoke of Self-Mastery as the key to life, for which a strict 
discipline is necessary. The dr ive to such a self-mastery 
ar»»ises when man realises the fact that he is mortal. 
This is what Soren Kierkegaard said, that a man who 
comes to realise that "all men are mortal" knows the universal 
essence of all existence, but what is needed is that he should 
apply this truth to himself and come to conclusion In his own 
case, ' I too must d i e ' . It is then that an Individual will feel 
the need to find a purpose, a plan and a destiny of life. From 
this existential point of view the doctrine of anatta has a deep 
significance in biblical theology and it is in this context that 
the psychophysical analysis of existence becomes meaningful. 
According to the teaching of the Budha, the idea of 
Self is an imaginary, false belief which has no corresponding 
reali ty and it produces harmful thoughts of 'me' and 'mine' , 
selfish desire , craving, attachment, hatred, i l l -wil l , conceit, 
p r ide , egoism and other defilements, impurities and problems. 
It is the source of all the troubles in the world from personal 
conflict to wars between nations. In short to this false view can 
13 be traced all the evil in the world. 
136 
In Budhism discomfort, i l lness, unsatisfactoriness, 
unrest, anxiety, state of commotion, conflict and existential 
anxiety are used in different contexts to express dukha. Dukha 
describes the predicament in which man is bound by conditioned 
existence in Samsaric l ife. It is tanha, the desire or thirst to 
exist to re -ex is t , to continue to exist , which arises as a result 
of the belief in a permanent Self or Soul which has thrown man 
into the predicament in which he i s . Therefore to eliminate 
dukha it is necessary that one comes to a true understanding of 
the real nature of the Self - that is that there is no permanent 
self; that one is anatta. Thus we may state the relavence of 
the anatta doctrine to the human predicament as follows: 
Man is in this dukha predicament because of his 
attachment (tanha) to a false notion of the self conceived as a 
permanent enti ty. In this oredicament in which man is threatend 
by the possibil i ty of non-being, he seeks for some security and 
imagines that he has an immortal soul on which he can depend. 
But he can not escape the fact that decay is inherent in all 
things. This conflict is the cause of dukha, it is the state of 
existential enxiety. It is an imaginary state of conflict between 
the real and the unreal conceptual invention of a permanent 
immortal self. And the solution to this problem consists in 
dispelling the false notion of the self. Hence it is of the 
utmost importance for one to real ise the fact of soullessness 
(anatta) . It is the realisation that leads to freedom from 
dukha. 
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Moreover for Dealienation, the principle underlying the 
institution of Islam is a lofty one. 
Islam abolishes all Invidious class distinction. 
Subjectively it creates a peaceful mental attitude and objectively 
"A 
a peaceful order perfectly congenial to nature and thus elimiates 
pain from struggle, gives intense pleasure in man's natural 
struggle for existence and ultimately liberates the intellect from 
bondage of the will of egoism and altruism by establishing 
15 
communion with (qudrat ) . 
Islam looks upon the universe as realitv and recognises 
everything as real entity there . Islan does not encourage 
monastic renunciation and Self-denial. It aims at a progressive 
realization of the immense power of human soul. A life of action 
and struggle is therefore an essential requisite. A man is 
regarded as a finite centre of activity with infinite capacity for 
transforming the evil into good. The ethical basis of Islam is to 
maintain the harmony between religion and life. It synthesises 
the practical with the ideal and can satisfy both the spiritual 
and temporal aspiration of man. The ethical life is not a cross-
section separated from the social context and from the organic 
whole of i ts own being. It takes a total view of human life and 
recognises the need and importance of reason and passion. It 
compares an individual life with that of community. And for 
dealienation what is needed is not individual morality but social 
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morality which is not generally found in the cases of other 
religions. Islam advocates for universal brotherhood of Tian. 
The Holy Quran says: 
"0 men! surely we have created you of a male and a 
female and made you tr ibes and families that you may know 
each other. Surely the most honourable of you with Allah is 
the one among you most careful of his duty". 
The concept of brotherhood does not remain as a 
theory rather it has turned to be a living force. Prcohet 
Mohammad (sm.) emphatically remarks: 
"No one of you is a believer of God unless he 
loves for his brother what he loves for 
himself". 
Islam encourages i ts believers to have a keen sense of 
dignity, responsibil i ty, unity, faith, and discipline in a vast 
community where each individual is free to develop his own 
personality and understanding. The Holy Quran provides 
instructions for proper living, thinking and doing justice to the 
people. Islam is closely bound up with every aspect of life 
and creates an atmosphere favourable to moral growth and 
development. It does not demand from man the surrender of 
h is reasoning faculties nor does it ask for blind subscription to 
inexplicable mystries which confuse and plague human 
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understanding. Holy prophet discovered the secrets of creation 
and interpreted life in relation to the universal nature. He 
taught an order in life. That is the simplest way of 
dealienation. 
Existentialism has yeilded penetrating insights into 
the mystery of human existence. Existentialism no doubt have 
developed an interesting approach to the problem of the 
feeling. But does not the granting of such a role commit us to 
an essentially tragic understanding of man as well as the 
world? Are we to take human existence as fundamentally 
absurd? 
Can't anxiety be avoided by seeking refuge in 
conventional patterns of action and conventional scales of value. 
Tagore considered grief to be a blessing of God which 
inspired him to write. Biographies depicting tales of courage 
and fortitude are pointers of hope. An indomitable spirit ruled 
the lives of Christ, Socrates, Galileo, Tolestoy, Lincoln and 
earned them a distinguished place in the annals of history. 
There achievement lies in their pledge not to let anxiety 
becloud judgement. We agree the suffering and unique men who 
not understood by their own age have met with nothing but 
contempt and suspicion. But we can not ignore the deeo sense 
of belonging which inspired many creative individuals, whose 
bonds with their communities enabled them to sense the pulse 
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of the i r age. And even those crea t ive men of the oast who 
found an urge to break away from the i r community, from the 
accepted ways of thought, did not experience the kind of 
isolation which has become t h e fate of modem man. Their 
existence was t ragic but not meaningless. They did not 
surrender t h e i r own s e l v e s . And in all the i r loneliness they 
did not go to p i eces , as modem men to when they try to olay 
roles which a r e al ien to them. 
The alienation which modem man experiences 
appears as a manifestation of a very fundamental trend i . e . 
h i s extrangement from God. How tradit ional religious language 
has spoken both negatively and posi t ively about God. It has 
recognised h i s worth and h is otherness as well as his love 
and his c loseness . Infact it i s Religion only that gives a 
connected amount of the different attemots which try to solve 
the problem of ex i s t ence . I t s h i s to ry attempts to insert each 
world-view in i t s proper sett ing to understand it as a part of 
organic whole, to connect it with the intel lectual , pol i t ica l , 
social and cul tural fac tors . 
It i s an a t t i tude of faith that world is something 
wor thwhi le . To a c iv i l i sed wor ld . Religion is the supersti t ion 
that a t t r ibu tes to the miser ies of man. But we ought to bear 
in mind that man by nature i s an imperfect being and 
the knowledge he has got i s more or less l imited. There a re 
so many things which a re unknown and inconceivable though 
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remaining phys ica l ly exis tent in the Dhenomena under 
inves t igat ion. Thus the supernatural agency though doubted 
can not pe rhaps be ignored. Religion must be regarded as one 
of the most important and fascinating way to dealienation. 
"Religion provides us with the conservation of 
socia l ly recognised values through specific actions. Though 
more or l ess a matter of feeling and practical experience, it 
t r i e s to gain a t rue insight into the general structure of the 
universe and man's re la t ion to i t and t r ies further to grasp 
the nature of the universe and to understand man's position, 
functions and dest iny in i t . Man at first interprets the 
phenomena and projects h i s own nature into them and fashions 
them after h i s own image. But above them there l ies an 
ul t imate Designer who is be l ieved to evoke some agency 
different from the ordinary ego of the individual or from other 
human beings and these imply a feeling of dependence upon 
th i s agency". 
Thus Religion always paves the way to better l i fe . 
The inner urge the struggle for existence and the philosophy 
of evolution offer us a foundation for the philosophy of 
conduct. Moral laws a r e the ru les of successful living. 
Nothing is good in human life except the best that 
man 's nature can ach ieve . As men advance, things which have 
been good cease to be good merely because something better is 
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possible. This better criterion is the outcome of Religlc.T. 
The activit ies of man are derived from three sources, namely 
instinct, mind and sp i r i t . Of these it is the life-spirit that 
makes religion. But these three factors are not actually 
separated from each other; but they are distinguishable in 
17 thought only. 
In our depersonalised world we don't find any 
harmony between instinct, mind and spi r i t . For a better and 
peaceful life these factors must go together, in order to avoid 
alienation. 
A religious man views love of man and women bo:ri 
in himself and in others quite differently from the man who is 
exclusively dominated by mind. He dedicates the life in the 
attainment of the ultimate reality and greater values in life. 
The l ife-spiri t has suffered in recent times by its association 
with traditional religion. It brings the joy of the vision, cf 
the mystery and profoundity of the world, of the contemplation 
1 ft 
of life and above all the joy of universal love. 
The good of man is thus the aim of Religion and for 
the attainment of this it has placed before man certain notions 
of morality. Religion derives a complete and a synthetic vie* 
of things and l ife. The good of the religious life rests in 
Cod who is the Supreme Being in th is universe. He exercises 
power over nature and man. Man's belief in God is as old as 
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his relation to the world. In his transactions with the world 
he often finds himself so olaced that his wishes, activities, 
fortunes, health and diseases are often beyond his control. 
Happenings appear to him quite puzzling and mysterious. They 
create in him a conviction that he is too small and helpless. 
So man ought to believe in a power which seems to control the 
destiny not only of his own but also of the world at large. 
That is the ultimate remedy for dealienation. 
From existentialism we can learn truths that are 
indespensable to our condition. The core of existential 
philosophy expresses man's alienation. It hardly shows and 
according to many of its advocates does not even claim to show-
a way out of the estrangement. 
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